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*
Associate Professor, Law School, State University of New York at Buffalo. In addition to the
usual inclusions about current employment, every law review article should begin with a starnote
where the author explains why this piece is being written, how it is supposed to achieve its objectives,
and what type of social context stimulated the author to embark on such a pursuit. Often the story
will run: I am writing this to get tenure. I want to please and excite three people who in turn will find
ten others to say I am an authentic scholar. I also want to bore or in other ways calm down ten or
twelve potentially hostile people who will do me less harm if they think I am not saying anything too
controversial, or better yet, if they do not think about me at all.
Because most of us live in social contexts not unlike that which produces the above, many of the
important things that ought to be discussed do not get said. Though the strategy of avoiding controversial positions makes sense from the perspective of each individual career move, the unintended
cumulative effect on society is detrimental. People's capacity for critical reasoning tends to be
deployed least where it is needed most. The first half of this article is my attempt to identify areas
where segments of our law teaching profession are going awry. The second half of this article is a
more proper academic piece. I have tried to show my capacity as an academic by reformulating
other people's ideas at great length. The style is carefully poised halfway between being unreadably
boring and bothersomely controversial.
The two halves of the article together suggest that proponents of a Critical Legal Studies movement are somewhat confused about what they are doing. They think they are spreading radicalism
and destroying the ideas of legal principle and Rule of Law; in fact, they are contributing to a
growing academic sophistication about legal principles while diverting radicals from developing effective forms of political rhetoric, many of which will at least implicitly rely on the idea of Rule of
Law. They think that liberalism is their enemy and that their critique exposes its bankruptcy. In fact,
they are basically liberals themselves, and their critique, if correctly oriented, tends to strengthen the
hand of reformist liberals against formalistic defenses of entrenched conservatism.
I am sure that various readers will disagree violently with some of the things said in Part One.
But I hope these readers will nevertheless defend-if not to the death, then at least at the coffee
machine- my right to say these things. To spurn the article's bonafide academic contributions on
the basis of certain statements in it having upset you %vouldviolate at least the spirit of our First
Amendment. My interest in liberalism as a force for good has been stimulated by research into the

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
III.

[Vol. 38

Part Two: Critical Legal Studies as a Contribution to
Jurisprudence .............................................
A. Realist and Formalist Conceptions of Legal Principle..
B. The Anti-Formalism of the Critical Legal Studies
Movement ...........................................
1. The "Incoherence of Doctrine" Critique: The
Problem of Unbounded Complementarity of
Rationalization Formats ..........................
2. The Problem of Inauthenticity that Emerges When
Existing Codes are Viewed as Attempts to
Actualize Liberal Values ..........................
3. Historically Contingent Necessity and the Claim of
Radical Indeterminacy ............................
C. Critical Functionalist Reconstruction of Legal
Principles ............................................
D. Critical Functionalism as Synthesizer of Realism and
Principle .............................................
E. The Political Tilt of Critical Functionalism ............
1. One-Dimensionality of Formalist Reasoning .......

111
113
120

121

124
129
134
137
143
143

unfolding "War on Drugs." This "war" appears increasingly as a kind of Trojan Horse posing serious risks to the continuation of liberal democratic social order in the United States. The fact that
many self-professed "liberals" support this "war" will no doubt contribute to the belief, particularily
among the young, that liberalism is an intrinsically fraudulent enterprise.
But liberalism is not responsible for the miserable state of our current mainstream politics any
more than Hegel and Nietzsche were responsible for Naziism. All ideas can be corrupted and made
into instruments for the subversion of what they profess. The trick is to recognize their authenticity
and corruption, and to know how to separate the two. Liberalism will not guarantee us a fine and
rational society any more than it will doom us to being a highly racist and hypocritically authoritarian one.
Liberalism, however, is one of our best tools for warding off a threatened future that is nasty,
brutish and short. It would seem that now, when the country is facing an authoritarian threat that
has captured several agencies of government and grows stronger by the month, is a particularly
inauspicious time for younger left scholars to be reflexively attacking liberalism, or for older, more
moderate ones to be routinely denouncing all political activity outside the mains)tream.
I am indebted to Alan Freeman and John Henry Schlegel who read and commented on Part
Two. Their criticisms and the state of current literature on CLS convinced me of the need to write a
separate Part One. For helping me to understand the timeless, and now increasingly urgent, political
importance of liberalism I thank David Richards. I am also indebted to Jonathan Johnsen, Howard
Aranoff, and John Mulholland for helpful research assistance. I also pay tribute to Professor John
Kaplan, both for his pioneering work on the irrationality of marijuana prohibition, and for the protection his work has over the years accorded thousands of Stanford undergraduates, myself once
included. As a result of the enlightened policies which John Kaplan's work did much to influence,
we have, almost all of us, gone on to become respected contributing professionals rather than clients
of an already overburdened criminal justice system.
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TRUCE FOR OUR TIMES

mistakes may be the mortar and springboard of history,1
eventually it comes time to admit and to rectify them. So it is with
cleavages between liberals, and radicals who have defined themselves in
opposition to one another. Rooted in the bitter experience of the decline
of the New Left some twenty years ago, 2 this antagonism has surfaced in
most social science disciplines. In law, it has taken the form of clashes
between would-be radicals committed to the development of an anti-liberal Critical Legal Studies movement, and liberals committed to expanding legal rights and preserving the Rule of Law.
However, in law as elsewhere, both the radicals' attacks and the liberals' responses have been largely counterproductive for the values
shared by each. Arguably the antagonism has been self-defeating in each
direction. The only forms of progressive radicalism that have shown
prospects of catching on in contemporary America are radical liberalism.
Conversely, the corporate and monetary dominance of national electoral
politics3 make it unlikely that liberalism could again become politically
dominant in the United States without significant radical activism on its
behalf. One may suspect that the antipathy between self-identified "radicals" and "liberals" has worked largely to the detriment of both.
Each side of this opposition has been a factor in the decline in political influence of liberalism in the United States. Because of this decline,
the last twenty years have witnessed the more humane and intelligent
segments of our political spectrum become equivocal and self-negating.
As a result, Americans have turned increasingly to conservative and neoauthoritarian fantasies, not because these have been in any way cogent or
beneficial, but because everyone yearns to stand for something, and liberHOUGH

1. See B. TUCHMAN, THE MARCH OF FOLLY (1984).
2. For the hopeful, and to a considerable extent happy, story of the rise of the New Left, see J.
MILLER, DEMOCRACY IS IN THE STREETS (1987). For a chronicling of different aspects of its decline, see T. GITLIN, THE WHOLE WORLD IS WATCHING: MASS MEDIA IN THE MAKING AND
UNMAKING OF THE NEw LEFT (1980), and K. SALE, SDS (1974).
3. See E. DREW, POLITICS AND MONEY: THE NEw ROAD TO CORRUPTION (1983); A. ETZIONI, CAPITAL CORRUPTION (1984); P. STERN, THE BEST CONGRESS MONEY CAN BUY (1988).

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

als in recent decades have frequently seemed not to stand firm for anything. They have tended either to become depoliticized or to expend their
limited courage and energy on the politically safe, but largely useless activity of berating would-be radicals. Hence the recurring clashes between
"liberals" whose identity is anchored by their being "not radical," and
"radicals" who are perennially unable to distinguish themselves from liberals in any serious programmatic way. Rather than producing any genuine alternative to liberalism, these clashes have served to divert attention
from the serious and substantial task of using universities as bases from
which to strengthen the causes of liberalism and internationalism in
American society.
Much of the bickering can be traced to the political center-left's failure of nerve in the waning years of the Civil Rights Movement and Vietnam War. For the first time in fifty years, a large segment of the
population had been organized to oppose governmental atrocities and
war. As the antiwar movement grew and threats of repression escalated,
the question was presented to the liberal left: should we restore peace on
the campuses by pretending Vietnam was an anomaly, or should we try
to extend our opposition from the war itself to the whole foreign policy
orientation that produced it? Similarly, with Civil Rights there came to
be a split between those favoring slow progress toward racial equality but
opposing black power, and those who recognized that transfer of power
was essential for meaningful equality. The majority who favored the former adopted" the self-image of "liberal"; those who favored black power
and a continued internationalist opposition to American militarism
adopted the label "radical." Each necessarily viewed the other with a
degree of suspicion and disdain.
Through the 1970's the moderate liberals prevailed. Campuses became depoliticized. A U.S.-backed fascist conspiracy to overthrow Chilean democracy achieved its objective with scarcely any protest in the
United States. Liberals came to be viewed as being opportunistically acquiescent and ungenuine in their liberalism. True to their instincts, they
favored the compromise of depoliticization at grassroots levels, but pursuit of foreign-policy reforms and civil rights legislation in Congress.
Limited success was achieved in exposing and curbing abuses of the
C.I.A. The troops were withdrawn from Southeast Asia, and some important civil rights legislation was passed. But in time, most of the liberal
Senators came to be removed from office, many having been targetted by
pro-defense political action committees wielding enormous de facto subsidies from the government.
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Although Watergate helped to propel a Democrat into the White
House, by the mid-1970's, mainstream national politics was poised to
become a string of worsening disappointments. Radicals' perceived need
to rebel remained high, but rebellion on a national level seemed increasingly futile. The general tendency of the less militaristic segments of the
population was to drop out of politics altogether.' Activists sought localities and microcosms within which to play out their rebellion.
Older liberals were left trying to hide from themselves the many
ways in which their principles and beliefs were deeply contradicted by
government policies. Younger people, some viewing themselves as "radical," were deeply disgusted by the squeamish behavior of their elders,
and sought to differentiate themselves from it. So there persisted an angry and seemingly sharp differentiation between "radicals" on the one
hand and "liberals" on the other. Both groups lost track of the fact that
all were basically liberals who were experiencing fear and rage in varying
degrees. Their common cause was easy to overlook because each so conveniently reaffirmed the other's prevailing passion: the liberals, disgusting
in their cowardice, fueled the radicals' angry contempt; the radicals, aimless in their angry disillusionment, fueled the liberals' fear of emerging

chaos.
This dynamic, which has been reverberating over the last twenty
years, has produced some rather shallow philosophizing aimed at
strawmen on both sides of the aisles it has spawned. Prominent among
the refuse has been the Critical Legal Studies attacks on liberalism, most

of which have been superficially philosophical, but also essentially sophomoric. This latter quality has now been effectively exposed by bright in-

terdisciplinarians such as Joan Williams,' Don Herzog,6 John Stick7 and
others. 8
4. See generally W. CROTTY, AMERICAN PARTIES IN DECLINE (1984).
5. Williams, Critical Legal Studies: The Death of Transcendence and the Rise of the New
Langdells, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 429 (1987).
6. Herzog, As Many as Six Impossible Things before Breakfast, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 609 (1987).
7. Stick, Can Nihilism be Pragmatic?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 332 (1986).
8. One of the first to set the general outlines of progressive political critique of critical legal
studies was Sparer, FundamentalHuman Rights, Legal Entitlements and the Social Struggle: A
Friendly Critiqueof the CriticalLegal Studies Movement, 36 STAN. L. REV. 509 (1984). Though I
rooted against (while partially agreeing with) him at the time, I would now concede that I am among
the many influenced directly or indirectly by Sparer. An important addition showing basic flaws in
the CLS approach to constructing radical political theory was Hutchinson & Monahan, Law, Politics, andthe CriticalLegal Scholars: The Unfolding Drama ofAmerican Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L.
REV. 199 (1984). (Parenthetically, it is here worth noting that my critique of CLS as a political
movement should not be interpreted as meaning it is not worthwhile to attend CLS conferences.
There one meets a great variety of interesting, talented people like, for example, Alan Hutchinson.)
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But if CLS leaders deserve jeers for their half-baked intrusions into

the world of political theory, some anti-CLS liberals also merit rebuke.
Having implicitly equated "rule of law" with obeying and not offending
those in government, they helped to make the concept appear so unappealing that no self-respecting political person would want to go near it.
By tacitly defining liberalism as "reasonable, not radical," they provided
license for some astonishingly crude betrayals of liberal principle to occur under the banner of liberalism.'
As radicals came increasingly to define "liberal" as meaning either

self-compromising involvement with corrupt government or total lack of
courage, they began to seek conceptual ways of distinguishing themselves
from liberals. Hence the fantasy of a radically anti-liberal Critical Legal
Studies movement. But the sad fact is that any movement for political
change must be rooted in the indigenous sentiments of the population it

seeks to organize, and for this purpose no one has come close to discovering an adequate substitute for liberalism. Though much maligned in our
national politics, liberalism remains very influential in our culturestrong in its libertarian, welfare-state, rationalistic and just plain good
neighbor tolerance incarnations.

It can now be argued that radicals should cease searching for conceptual means of opposing liberalism and "attempt to recover some of

the content and surprise of liberalism" 10 since the source of the failure of
nerve that inspired their antipathy was not the ideas of liberalism per se
but the human frailty and lack of courage of people who happened to be

liberals. The ironic result of their misplaced rivalry is that liberals and
radicals now confront pressures to become what they would least like to
be. Radicals increasingly must think of devoting their energies to a de-

fense of liberal social order, lest our society become not only irrationally
Some minority scholars have also contributed powerful critiques. Two of the clearest and most comprehensively developed are Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: CriticalLegal Studies and Reparations,
22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987), and Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in AntidiscriminationLaw, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988). One of the
tersest but also keenest is Dalton, The Clouded Prism, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 435 (1987).
Other fine critiques of CLS political theory include Finnis, On the CriticalLegal Studies Movement,
30 AM. J. JURIS. 21 (1985), and Asaro, The Public/PrivateDistinction in American Liberal Thought:
Unger's Critique and Synthesis, 28 AM. J. JURIS. 118 (1983).
9. Some instances where large numbers of self-professed "liberals" have grossly betrayed liberalism include, most recently, support for extreme and arbitary measures in the War on Drugs; before
that, support for American militarists seeking to destabilize the government of Nicaragua; and well
before that a tactically unwise decision to concede issues of freedom of speech and electoral campaign finance regulation to the right wing.
10. See Herzog, supra note 6, at 610.
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militaristic, but increasingly authoritarian as well. Liberals, having now
been all-but-fully exiled from the centers of power, must begin to think
about adopting some of the methods and goals of radical activism if they
are to have any hope of building grassroots support and regaining lost
influence. Perhaps the time has come for intellectuals of the center-left to
abandon past mistakes of enhancing rivalries between liberals and radicals, and to work instead for a common cause of liberalism that for better
or worse, is likely to be taking on an increasingly radical character.
It is in this vein that I offer a two-part assessment of the Critical
Legal Studies movement. By "movement" I mean something much narrower than the totality of scholars and work presented at various CLS
conferences. The term refers to a somewhat theoretically unified collection of work that has been contributed to by most of the main founders of
CLS and centers around the idea of indeterminacy of legal doctrine
(hereafter "CLS-indeterminacy approach" or "radical indeterminacy approach"). 11 This work constitutes the major distinctive CLS theoretical
contribution to jurisprudence and political theory, and it has an ambivalent character. In the eyes of its founders, CLS has sought to be both a

jurisprudential movement affecting the way we think of law, and a political movement stimulating the growth of political radicalism in the
United States."z My two part assessment turns on this distinction. As a

contribution to jurisprudence, CLS has been useful particularly for clearing away vestiges of outmoded legal formalism1 3 and inviting more so-

phisticated, social science-oriented ways of thinking about law and legal
principles. As a basis for a political movement, however, the CLS-inde11. Rather than attempt to pick out particular works that are most exemplary I will merely
mention several names prominently associated with the predominant CLS-indeterminacy approach-Duncan Kennedy, Robert Gordon, Clare Dalton, Mark Kelman, Mark Tushnet, Karl
Klare, Frances Olsen, Roberto Unger, Gerald Frug and Peter Gabel, to name ten-and defer to the
clear and helpful summary recently offered by Minda, The JurisprudentialMovements of the 1980's,
50 OHIO ST. L. J. 599 (1989), along with the earlier summary, Note, 'Roundand Round the Bramble
Bush: From Legal Realism to Critical Legal Studies, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1669 (1982). In a more
comprehensive vein, see M. KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987), which attempts to articulate an overarching philosophical coherence of the CLS-indeterminacy approach
generally. The attempt is useful, even though part of its usefulness has come in helping critics to
focus their attacks on incoherent aspects of CLS ideas. See, eg., Stick, Review ofN. Kelman, A Guide
to CriticalLegal Studies (Book Review), 88 COLtJM. L. REV. 407 (1988).
12. See Minda, supra note 11; BinderOn CriticalLegal Studies as Guerrilla Warfare, 76 GEO.
L. J. 1 (1987); Schlegel, Notes Toward an Intimate, Opinionated, and Affectionate History of the
Conferenceon CriticalLegal Studies, 36 STAN. L. REV. 391 (1984). In a somewhat exhuberant vein,
Tushnet warns fellow CLSers that "when they find out what we are doing they're going to come
after us with guns." Id. at 403.
13. One quintessential CLS work that does this brilliantly is Tushnet, Followingthe Rules Laid
Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983).
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terminacy approach has fared poorly. Its contribution has been on balance negative-not so much because of particular adverse effects it has
caused, but because it has been strikingly ineffectual.
Since this latter assessment places me among the ranks of liberal
critics of CLS, I wish to differentiate my position from three types of
criticism that I do not share. First, I do not think that the CLS-indeterminacy approach should be condemned for being nihilist, but only for
lacking moral force and being politically ineffective. Nihilism can be an
appropriate concomitant and facilitator of reformism in certain circumstances. I will attempt to demonstrate that certain traditional legal approaches and liberal doctrines, such as First Amendment separation of
church and state, now furnish a much stronger basis for effective nihilism
than does CLS-indeterminacy theory. 4 Critical Legal Studies, though
superficially negative in form, bears a relation to real nihilism much like
that of strawberry wine cooler to fine cognac. Theoretically, one can become intoxicated and experience a sense of empowerment with either,
but the latter is stronger, more seductive, and thus more likely to achieve
the result.
Secondly, I do not believe that CLS has had any profound demoralizing effect on defenders of civil liberties or that it has inadvertently
ushered in an authoritarian politics by weakening people's conceptions of
legal rights."1 At most, it has contributed to political deterioration indirectly by routing a significant number of very talented people toward
various recitations of indeterminacy theory and away from work that
might have turned out to be more usefully connected with political
activity.
Thirdly, I wish to disassociate myself from the suggestion made by
one irresponsible law school dean that persons associated with CLS
14. In this respect I would note the prescient words of Harlan Dalton: "In my view, negative
critique and positive program are, or at least can be, symbiotic; the former launches the latter and
keeps it on course, whereas the latter saves the former from petulance and self-parody." Dalton,
supra note 8, at 436 n.4. See also, Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism andLegal Theory, 94
YALE L. J. 1 (1984).
15. In this respect the fear raised by Sparer, supra note 8, at 516-552, may have been somewhat
exaggerated except insofar as some CLS people may have contributed to a heightening of the nastiness of academic politics. But realistically, most of the nastiness around the country has come from
traditional legal scholars, many of whom profess to be liberals. While the declining hopes of public
interest law and the decreased willingfiess of courts to take liberal rights seriously may indeed be
moving the country dangerously closer to authoritarianism, the total CLS contribution to this pro.
cess is probably equivalent to that of one ten-minute nap by Ronald Reagan, except insofar as one
posits speculatively that people influenced by the CLS-indeterminacy approach might otherwise
have been doing things that were politically more useful.
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ought not to be teaching in law schools. i6 There have been two bases put
forward for that suggestion-that CLS is a dangerous form of radicalism,
and that it will cause mass demoralization by negating all conceptions of
legal principle. The first half of this article argues that CLS-indeterminacy theory is an extremely undangerous form of radicalism, and the
second, that it does not negate conceptions of legal principle or ordered
doctrine. It simply places pressure on advocates to define legal principles
in a more sophisticated way. Thus, it may be argued that the purge suggestions stem from tendencies aptly described by the titles of Richard
Hofstadter's two books, The ParanoidStyle in American Politics and
Anti-Intellectualism in American Life.
II.
A.

PART ONE: CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES AS A
POLITICAL MOVEMENT

Taking Liberalism Seriously: Exploring the Potential That Lies
Beyond Impulsive Radical Rejection

It is a characteristic American faith that nearly everything can be
solved by advances in technology. In accord with this, it could be argued
that some of the stranger and more radical of CLS propositions, such as
the dictum to oppose all illegitimate hierarchy,17 to relocate major political power in the hands of city officials,"8 and to place the basic terms of
social life politically up for grabs,19 could become appropriate if we had a
certain new invention-a time machine. If, for example, we could return
to the days of the Paris Commune during the Franco-Prussian War, then
each of these suggestions might be, if not well-advised, then at least polit16. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222 (1984); for critique see Minda,
Of Law, the River and Legal Education, 10 NOVA L. J. 705 (1986) (and works cited therein).
17.

See D. KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF HIERARCHY: A PO-

AGAINST THE SYSTEM (1983); Kennedy, Legal Educationand the Reproduction ofHierarchy,
32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 591 (1982).
18. See Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1980). The idea of relocating greater political power in cities, unlike the abolition of hierarchy or the basic terms of political
life being continually up for grabs, is not inherently implausible. But Frug's implicit proposal only
makes political sense in the context of the general shift of power away from nation-states in order to
create a viable international order. Internationalist kinds of issues furnish some of the strongest
reasons for favoring a relocalization of taxing power and control of at least some basic policies. For
example, I think we would all be safer and better off generally if the broad outlines of our nation's
nuclear policies and "covert action" initiatives were controlled by a confederation of city governments rather than by the entrenched bureaucracies in Washington, some of which still dwell mentally in pre-nuclear realities. See S. KULL, MINDS AT WAR (1989). Unlike the German Green Party
(e.g., "think globally, act locally"), Frug does not draw the connection between localism and internationalism because the latter is viewed as largely beyond the ambit of Critical Legal Studies.
19. See R. UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986).
LEMIC
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ically plausible-although it would still be appropriate to pay greater attention to the imperatives of armed self-defense than either the
Commune or CLS scholars have done.
Unfortunately, though, we cannot change our historical context
merely by wishing we had another. At least until the time machine is
invented, we should base political critiques and plans for organizing
political movements on realistic assessments of the possibilities posed by
our actual historical circumstances. Our current period is one dominated
by the rapid rise of life-transforming technologies: nuclear weapons, television, computers, tools of global industrialization and, vastly improved
means of transportation and communication. These changes have affected politics in at least three major ways. They have made the nationstate obsolete as a viable unit of military territorial sovereignty and set in
motion a historical clock during which a viable international order will
be achieved or global destruction from war or insufficient ecological regulation will result.2 ° They have at least arguably strengthened the political power of elites against their populaces by heightening dependence on
elite-dominated instruments of mass communication, and by making
armed insurrection too costly in terms of human life. And they have reinforced the importance of liberalism's program of organizing tolerance
and peaceful coexistence among diverse racial, ethnic, cultural and religious groups;" all of whom must learn to live together in the global
village.
Currently in the United States, we are experiencing a kind of political confusion and backlash against liberalism that threatens to impose a
substantially more authoritarian domestic social order.22 The stock CLS
formula of attacking "liberal legalism" is becoming increasingly inappropriate as a result. Insofar as what is being objected to is the codification
of liberal ideas in law, I would argue that it is politically preferable to
favor legalism of this sort. The CLS idea of "overcoming the public-private distinction," while attractive from a socialist perspective if one keys
the word "private" to the abuses of insufficiently regulated corporations,
takes on a rather different cast when applied to individuals and politically
20.

See S. KIM, THE QUEST FOR A JUST WORLD ORDER (1984); J. SCHELL, FATE OF THE
(1982); SEARCH FOR SANITY: THE POLITICS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DISARMAMENT
(P. Joseph & S. Rosenblum eds. 1984).
21. See D. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION (1989); D. RICHARDS, SEX,
EARTH

DRUGS, DEATH AND THE LAW: AN ESSAY ON HUMAN

RIGHTS AND OVERCRIMINALIZATION

(1982).
22. See A. TREBACH, THE GREAT DRUG WAR (1987); Cowan, How The Narcs Created Crack,
NAT'L. REV., Dec. 5, 1986, at 2; Zeese, No More Drug War, NAT'L, L. J., July 7, 1986, at 13.
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targeted cultural or ethnic minorities. Roberto Unger's alluring vision
of overcoming the liberal separation of self and others 23 may ring true
during moments of ecstatic communion taking place within voluntary
organizations, but something rather different is summoned forth when
the individuals to be merged are twenty-five million marijuana users, and
the "community" is a national one headed by Oliver Cromwell's heirapparent, William Bennett. Likewise, it may be argued that politics itself
depends on a distinctive public sphere to achieve the kinds of dialogue
that make rational governance possible.24 If by "liberal legalism" CLS
writers intend to target not law's specifically liberal content, but the very
project of law and legalism itself, then it may be contended that they
have chosen a target that is simply too large and fundamental to our kind
of society for them to make any significant headway against. Also, even if
the transcendence of law as a constraining social form could be achieved,
it is easier to envision bad things (life becoming nasty, brutish and short)
resulting than good ones (overcoming of alienation through submergence
in self-actualizing community).
Probably what is meant by the term "liberal legalism" is something
narrower than any of the above interpretations. CLS radicals may be expressing their revulsion at liberal legal scholars who are afraid to clash in
any serious way with the political prescriptions of the dominant national
power centers. If so, the revulsion may be well-grounded, but it should be
expressed more clearly as a denunciation of the scholars' lack of political
courage-especially since that lack is likely to be manifested as an abandonment rather than promotion of liberal ideas.
What is really needed is an intelligent truce between those who understand that liberalism and internationalism are both essential for any
revival of political sanity in our country, and those who have the impulses of personal radicalism and courage that could help them to become effective, politically engaged organizers and intellectuals. At last, in
what I think will stand as a landmark article, Don Herzog has initiated
suggestions that if followed, could lead to such a truce.25
Herzog's first suggestion is that CLS writers "drop their mechanical
polemic against liberalism" because it is based on "a reading of liber23. This idea was originally articulated in R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLrrIcs (1978), and
has been a continuing theme throughout Unger's subsequent work. For Critique see Powell, The
Gospel According to Roberto: A Theological Polemic, 1988 DUKE L. J. 1013 (1988).
24. See Asaro, supra note 8,at 143-148 (applying theory of Hannah Arendt).
25. See Herzog, supra note 6.
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alism" that is "a mess." 2 6 Their reading is inadequate because it is based
on a methodology of taking political slogans wielded by liberals in the
past, removing them from their political contexts, and then equating
them with liberalism as a philosophical system. The result is an easy
trashing of an absurd straw-man. Liberals, Herzog argues:
[D]id not advance a set of hopelessly naive claims about subjectivity, individualism, the naturalness of social relationships, and the formalism of law.
Instead they brandished such claims as political weapons. And their goals
were admirable: they sought to put an end to religious civil war, to alert
individuals to the potentially oppressive claims of groups and leaders, to
stop market meddling that impoverished already poor
27 workers, and to eliminate capricious sovereign meddling in legal affairs.
Confusion is generated by CLS writers forgetting about politics when
they address liberalism. The political slogans wielded by liberals are
treated by CLS authors as claims about metaphysics,
epistemology, the structure of the self, ethics-as anything but political
claims. It's as though liberals began with abstruse philosophical premises
and from them 28
deduced liberal politics. This reading of liberalism is naive
and misleading.

The polemic against liberalism should be abandoned, Herzog argues, because liberal categories such as individual rights, equality under
the law, separation of church and state, and reasoned pursuit of general
welfare need not be seen as:
[T]rite or worse yet nefarious coverups for the continuing failure of allegedly liberal societies to deal with poverty and racism, exploitation and sexism, neocolonialism and the all too well orchestrated government
suppression of radical politics.
It's perfectly coherent to agree that we face severe problems and at the
same time to embrace liberalism. Indeed, one might think that liberalism
provides just the right resources for criticizing our practices and suggesting
changes. To take that possibility seriously,
we need to recapture some of the
29
content and surprise of liberalism.
Similarly, CLS denunciations of the very idea of Rule of Law ought
to be toned down to correspond to the actual force of legal realist and
CLS attacks on legal formalism. Typically, these denunciations are
double-barrelled-the Rule of Law concept is "trashed" 3 for being polit26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 630.
Id.
Id. at 611.
Id. at 609-10.
See Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293 (1984).
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ically pernicious in general, and then seen as entirely illusory in any
event. Legal rights are viewed as more chimera than substance because
"rights discourse is internally inconsistent, vacuous or circular. Legal
thought can generate equally plausible rights justifications for almost any
31
result."
What ought to be said is that both the Rule of Law concept and
rights discourse can be used in politically pernicious ways, depending
upon their particular usage and context, and that the idea of Rule of Law
becomes largely illusory if overstated in wiys that are invited by extreme
or simplistic versions of legal formalism. But the failure to satisfy extreme formalist criteria of objectivity and separation from politics do not
negate the existence of doctrinal regularities differentiating law from
purely ad hoe politics; nor does it mean that legal rights have no substance that is worth preserving. This principal fallacy underlying CLS
attacks on "rights discourse" and Rule of Law has been ably described
by Joan Williams in a particularly important and illuminating article.32
Williams both gives CLS scholars their due as interpreters and appliers of what she calls "the second wave of the new epistemology" and
exposes some significant weaknesses of their endeavor. She notes that the
radical indeterminacy claims of CLS "Irrationalists" rest on a fundamental inconsistency. Proponents of this view reject the old "picture theory"
epistemology of legal formalism by exposing the historically contingent,
political nature of law, but then fall into embracing a dichotomy between
objective analytic certainty, and pure arbitrariness and unconstrained
choice. However, this dichotomy itself derives from the old "picture theory" epistemology that CLS scholars reject. Having lapsed back into the
very thing they were transcending, CLS scholars fail to grasp the existence of intermediate, historically contingent forms of determinism that
are present in the shared understandings of actors in a given culture and
period. Williams' application of a Wittgensteinian approach shows how
CLS falls far short of demonstrating any infinite manipulability of legal
doctrine, other than in a fictitious world where the only sources of con33
straint are derived from abstract, analytic logic.
Neither Williams nor the other critics have sought to analyze why
this weakness appears. Clearly it does not come simply from lack of intellectual talent. The leading CLS writers appear consistently impressive in
31.
Kairys
32.
33.

Kennedy, Legal Education as a Trainingfor Hierarchy, in THE POLITIcS OF LAW 46 (D.
ed. 1982).
Williams, supra note 5, at 471-96.
Id.
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their fluency and erudition. Their philosophical weakness can be seen as
a cost borne by scholars attempting, whether heroically or not, to become radical, politically engaged intellectuals. In order to make their enterprise, which is considerably stronger as creative scholarship than as
radical praxis, appear even remotely plausible as a basis for political
transformation, CLS scholars have felt impelled to make grandiose
claims exaggerating their own potential to effect transformation. 34 So, for
example, their demonstrations of doctrinal manipulability-which Williams sees only as "highlight[ing] our responsibility for the certainties we
choose"a--are viewed more grandly as something that will trigger widespread rebellion against law's hypocrisy and delegitimize the existing
legal order by revealing its arbitrariness. This hope appears to be accompanied by an extreme idealism which suggests that intellectuals can
transform the world by reimagining it in the comprehensive manner occasioned by the practice of "total critique."36
Herzog, rejecting both this idealism and the extreme formalism
against which CLS writers react, proudly describes his having spent
years arguing that "law is politics carried on by other means,"3 7 but he
chides the author of the statement, "law is politics pure and simple"3 for
failing to seriously consider the implications of "by other means." In
other words, the concept of Rule of Law is not an impossibility. But what
is impossible, and properly rejected by CLS, is the attempt to use the
concept as a basis for arguing that law is either "politically neutral" or
"above politics" in every sense of the word. It is worth noting that contemporary leading proponents of the Rule of Law, such as Ronald Dworkin, do not make such claims.3 9
The reason that Rule of Law cannot be deemed pernicious in general-apart from the fact that it frequently is used to defend desirable
social practices-is that CLS imaginings of how its rejection will automatically liberate are unfounded. Herzog states:
[n]othing of political note in the debate between CLS writers and liberals
follows from accepting the claim that forms of life are socially constructed
34. See R UNGER, supra note 19 (expressing faith that exposure of indeterminacy of legal doctrine could stimulate oppositional movements); see also note 12, supra.
35. Williams, supra note 5, at 496.
36. See, e-g., Boyle, The PoliticsofReason: CriticalLegal Theory andLocal Social Thought, 133
U. PA. L. REV. 685 (1985).
37. Herzog, supra note 6, at 611.
38. Schlegel, supra note 12, at 411.
39. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986) (law viewed as a means of achieving and
adapting a substantive political vision).
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and not mandated by any kind of natural or transcendant necessity. It does
not follow, for instance, that radical change may be achieved simply by
persuading people of the social construction thesis. Nor does it follow that
everything must always be up for grabs.'
For these reasons acceptance of the Rule of Law idea, or of legal doctrine
as having some degree of coherence and consistency cannot be assumed
to be a primary factor negating people's political freedom to transform
the world.
Rule of Law should not be seen as simply illusory because the concept can still have a meaningful existence even when extreme formalist
versions of it are abandoned. Herzog notes:
CLS writers pose a stark binary choice: either the law tells passive
judges what to do, either rules times facts equals decisions, or it is all up for
grabs and anything goes. It would be profitable here for defenders of legal
interpretation
4 1 to explore middle grounds, to articulate positions that differ
from both.
True indeed, and easy from this to see what is very likely the major
contribution of CLS to jurisprudence: in the longstanding debate over
principles versus adhocracy in law, CLS has forcefully articulated the
negative moment when antiquated formalist conceptions of legal principle are cast aside. No longer can anyone straight-facedly say that judicial
opinions represent complete statements and application of legal
principle.42
But it is most unlikely that the longstanding debate will end at this
point. More likely, there will be a new positive moment in response
when middle-ground theories, probably of a functionalist sort, anchor
connected bodies of doctrine in terms of larger underlying programs
which make recurring doctrinal patterns appear sensible and correct.4 3
In the second half of this article I argue that CLS-indeterminacy critique's greatest significance may be in furthering the development of such
conceptions of legal principle.
However, at this point the more interesting questions are the political ones, and questions pertaining to the evolution of jurisprudence are
pertinent only in one respect: they affirm that CLS has had real value in
40.

Herzog, supra note 6, at 622-23.

41. Id. at 629.
42. See discussion in Part Two, Section B infra.
43. See Williams, supra note 5, at 491-496. For an example of an attempt to formulate such a
theory in the First Amendment context, see Blum, The DivisibleFirst Amendment: A CriticalFunctionalistApproach to Freedom ofSpeech and ElectoralCampaign Spending, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1273

(1983).
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legal education in at least two regards. It has been a quite useful corrective-and I speak from the experience of being educated first by traditional, formalist-leaning Harvard Law School professors and then by
CLSers-to the not inconsiderable naivete fostered in students by law
professors' penchant for teaching "in-role" as lawyers or judges and thus
speaking more in the language of formalism than any sophisticated person would now think. But students, if unexposed to the CLS counterpoint, really do learn to think that way, and probably are made more
helpless as neophyte attorneys as a result. Also, as mentioned, CLS has
constituted a negative moment or antithesis in the dialectical evolution of
conceptions of legal principle. This achievement retains its value even if
the kinds of future accomplishments to which CLS may be leading are
things that CLS leaders themselves disdain.
It is worth emphasizing that the positive achievements of CLS in no
way depend upon its leaders' radical fantasies that have grossly exaggerated the transformative potential of their work. Nor do the achievements
depend upon the harsh, albeit philosophically incoherent, rejections of
liberalism and Rule of Law that such fantasies have encouraged. If CLS
leaders are still serious about promoting political radicalism, then they
ought to consider retracting some of their past positions and opening
their minds to alternative approaches. Their radical indeterminacy theory has hamstrung them by making anathema certain concepts that
could now become supremely useful in the project to which they have
aspired. It has also directed them to conceptualize politics at a level of
abstraction where confusion comes easily. Sporadic, confused utterances
have resulted, as when one of the brightest and most politically committed of second-generation CLS scholars showed up at our law school only
to tell a crowd of people that his methodology was "to tell people to take
wrong turns." The crowd was not impressed. Nor were a group of international human rights activists impressed when another CLS luminary
showed up to warn them against continuing their good-hearted "spreading of legalistic false consciousness." '
The first-generation CLS scholars who have striven to maintain an
ideologically coherent, politically radical movement have diverted political energy more than they have inspired it. By maintaining a strong pretense of radicalism largely unmatched by substance, they have triggered
reaction and academic firings without even developing the politically
threatening quality that usually summons forth repression of this nature.
44. Because I regard both this speaker and the one previously quoted as friends, and am aware
that each is both very bright and in some ways politically committed, I decline to identify either.
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Consequently, the limited political practice of CLS has been largely defensive or reactive in nature, consisting of acceding to demands of minority scholars that they aggressively promote affirmative action and of
trying to defend the academic career prospects of scholars tagged as being in CLS. Reforms that stretch beyond the confines of legal academia,
such as favoring legalization of marijuana, liberalization of government
secrecy laws, or regulation of campaign finance, have been tacitly rejected as beyond the pale of CLS.
So it would appear that CLS leaders in their incarnation as political
radicals have little to lose by accepting Herzog's truce offering. But the
"truce" as articulated thus far is one-sided. It comes close to being a
simple call for surrender and does not address the underlying problem of
self-professed liberals' political inauthenticity that originally inspired the
revulsion and desire to turn against liberalism. While Herzog himself decries "the continuing failure of allegedly liberal societies to deal with
poverty and racism, exploitation and sexism, neocolonialism and the all
too well orchestrated government suppression of radical politics" and
notes the aggravating effects of "self-avowed liberals who are complacent, even smug, in downplaying or denying our social and political
problems,"4 he does not propose any means of redressing even the latter.
He merely suggests that CLS scholars not "insist ahead of time that
[their] analysis be radical."4 6
The converse, which I will present under the rubric of Taking Liberalism Seriously (TLS) is that liberals should not insist that their analyses
always be politically moderate or centrist. They should commit themselves at least in the first instance to the moral philosophical project of
identifying the liberal principles to which they will adhere. Secondly,
they should be open to diverse opinions about which areas of law pose
particularly grave or sharp problems of injustice, oppression or betrayal
of liberal principles. They should then be willing to learn facts pertinent
to these areas and take seriously the implications of these facts for the
principles to which they have committed themselves. Part of taking facts
seriously involves exercising due diligence in learning when not to rely on
the demagoguery of official sources, but to embrace information from
alternative or even suppressed sources. 4 If this is done, I suspect that
45. Herzog, supra note 6, at 610.
46. Id.
47. See, eg., E. CHAMORRO, PACKAGING THE CONTRAS: A CASE OF CIA DISINFORMATION
(1987) (publications from the Institute for Media Analysis, Inc.); C. GINSBURG, RACE AND MEDIA:
THE ENDURING LIFE OF THE MOYNIHAN REPORT (1989).
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liberalism will no longer be seen "as a creaky old doctrine that inspires
only groans and boredom on the left."4 8
Similarly, if the Rule of Law concept is to be politically rehabilitated, it should be made clear that "law" is not the exclusive province of
a judiciary that has grown less liberal with each passing year. Rather, it
should be seen as having diverse but connected layers-some comprised
of the moral principles and expectations of the people which condition
their views of what is and is not valid law, and others consisting of the
positive doctrine laid down by courts and other officially authorized decisionmakers. We may then speak of contradictions, conflicts and strain
within the law and view law largely in the way suggested by Robert
Cover-as an ongoing dialogue between rulers and ruled, in which each
may legitimately take some of the initiative in fostering change.4 9 In
short, the Rule of Law idea must be divorced not only from the crude
legal formalism of the past, but from the legal positivism that has been
implicit in smug liberals' definitions of themselves as "reasonable, not
radical."
If liberalism is really taken seriously in this way, then it will have
significant implications for academic disciplinary boundaries and the way
law teaching is conceived. No longer should we be tied to studying simply that which appellate courts pronounce. The creation of well-informed
socially responsible citizens should be an explicit mission. Law faculties
might, then take greater initiative in proposing long-overdue law reform
that seems not to be occurring through the primary channels of government. Liberals will be pressed to develop the courage of their convictions,
and with it a willingness to stand openly against the oppressive and irrational policies of our national government.
For example, we ought to take seriously the liberal idea of government's fundamental obligations to act rationally and to promote the general welfare. For this it will not suffice to engage in rhetorical
demonstrations of how the concept of "national security" is vacuous, circular, internally inconsistent, et cetera. We must learn about the nuclear
arms race, and the subversive nature of the CIA's militaristic adventurism in the third world, and we must be able to explain why both are
fundamentally at odds with the real security needs of the American peo48. Herzog, supra note 6, at 609.
49. Cover, Nomos and Narrative:Forewordto the Supreme Court 1982 Term, 97 HARV. L. REv.
4 (1983).
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ple.50 In short, we must allow open advocacy of internationalism, and
not insist in advance that liberals do nothing to cast doubt on their loyalty to the nation-state.
In taking seriously the liberal ideas of rational governance and
checking abuses of power, we should be able to spot failures where they
are occurring. Ideally, our national government has three separate
branches-the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary-that check
the errors and excesses of one another. There is also the ostensibly "free
press," the fourth estate, that independently checks abuses by truthfully
informing the people of them. But what if the reality is rather different?
What if we find in one policy area after another collusion between Congress and the executive in support of patently irrational policies that are
effectively rubber stamped by the judiciary? What if the media, instead of
truthfully exposing, simply heightens politicians' temptation to become
demagogues by rewarding them with favorable coverage whenever they
stimulate excitement by appealing to widespread prejudices?"'
Might it not then be suggested in accordance with the TLS program
that there is now a need for a fifth estate to check the combined abuses of
the other four? Does it not seem likely that universities are the only major societal institution that is well equipped to play this role? Would this
not call for some revision of academic standards to reward careful, truthful scholarship that is politically engaged and does not saddle itself with
the false objectivity of mirroring the prevailing prejudices of those in
government?
If there are substantial numbers of liberals in academia who are
open to such a proposed truce, then clearly TLS is a direction in which
radicals should be heading. In the remainder of the first half of this article, I will present two types of arguments in favor of the TLS approach.
The first addresses the nature of political radicalism and argues that a
concept of moralforce is central to its success. I will argue that CLSindeterminacy theory is radically self-limiting as a basis for political radicalism because critiques that are rooted in it are destined to be highly
abstract and to lack moral force. By contrast, I will argue that moral
force in our society is closely connected with ideas of standing, arbitrariness, truth and falsehood, perceived irrationality, and deprivation of liberty-in short, the main ideas of liberal legalism.
50. See, e.g., J. KwiTNY, ENDLESS ENEMIES (1985); T. GERVASI, THE MYTH OF SOVIET MILITARY SUPERIORITY (1988).
51. See E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE (1975); B. GINSBURG, THE CAPTIVE PUBLIS (1986); M. PARENTI, INVENTING REALITY (1986).
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Secondly, I will attempt to demonstrate the much stronger moral
force of arguments rooted in a TLS approach by presenting an actual
political exhortation in the form of a letter to colleagues. The letter will
have a principally nihilist character both because this is an area where
CLS-indeterminacy approaches might be thought to have an advantage,
and because it affords an opportunity to show readers unfamiliar with
political theory what real nihilism looks like. 2 Readers may then contrast it with the anemic reflection of nihilism that appears in some CLS
literature.
B. Moral Force and the PoliticalLimits of a CLS-Indeterminacy
Approach
Assume for purposes of argument that our goal is to promote political radicalism in and around law schools. We want to know whether a
better conceptual vehicle for this can be found by organizing legal scholars around Critical Legal Studies rejections of what its founders call "liberal legalism," or by using familiar concepts of liberal legalism to express
shared outrage over things that are happening in society. A closely related question is whether to attack law in general for being basically a
sham, or whether to attack particular areas of law as being out of sorts
with the ideals and principles of our laws generally.
Let us begin by articulating the kind of critique that progressive critics of CLS-indeterminacy theory would be likely to present. They would
probably view the theory as not terribly radical in its substantive political
implications, but as having a heretical character because it clashes with
the way most advocates of social change have conceived of the relation
between their movements and law.
Indeterminists' strategy of delegitimatizing all legal principles can
be characterized as a kind of urban renewal model of social change. It
views the existing legal order as a blighted landscape which should be
leveled, so that more attractive structures can then be constructed, or
open spaces preserved. Such a model is unrealistic, insofar as it implicitly
envisions a society so free from conflict and coercion that people are able
to transcend their psychological needs to identify with legal authority. A
better analogy might be drawn between legal principles and buildings in
52. See, eg., Nock, On Doing the Right Thing, in OUR ENEMY THE STATE (1950); L. SPOONER,
VICES ARE NOT CRIMES: A VINDICATION OF MORAL LIBERTY (1980); R. TUCKER, INSTEAD OF A
BOOK: BY A MAN TOO BUSY TO WRITE His OWN (1897); REVOLUTIONARY PAMPHLETS (R. Bald-

win ed. 1927).
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protracted urban guerilla warfare.5 3 Combatants in such struggles do not
seek to level every building in the area. Rather, they inhabit some structures which are used as bases in fighting the opposition who inhabit other
structures. Different legal rules and principles are in some sense inhabited, by contending social groups. The shelter they provide is two-fold,
encompassing both protection from hostile forces, and satisfaction of the
need to perceive oneself and one's political initiatives as lawful.
The fact that diverse laws differentially furnish supporting contexts
for the political initiatives of various groups imbues legal doctrine with
heterogeneous political meaning. If existing doctrine encompasses some
patterns that have genuine strategic value for progressive change, then
there is an argument that the proponents of such change should have the
intellectual capacity to formulate and defend legal principles, as well as
attack them. Such defense seems particularly appropriate when political
initiative is largely with the forces of reaction, and progressive forces are
seeking to freeze and perpetuate relatively congenial aspects of the legal
order.
But regardless of the particular political context, there are strong
reasons to doubt the political efficacy of any strategy aimed at delegitimizing law generally. CLS proponents would likely have more success
if their renunciation of legal principles were conceived of as an intermittent tactic rather than a general program. Hence, the question posed by
indeterminists-whether one favors legitimacy or delegitimation in general-may be politically the wrong question;54 the right one being, when
should particular doctrines be supported or undermined?
If renunciation of established legal principles were conceived of as
tactic rather than program, it would be applied sparingly and directed at
the most politically regressive rules and patterns. Renouncing principle
in some areas of law (either by disavowing coherence or by denouncing
the purposes that underlie acknowledged coherence) would be seen as
compatible with taking the opposite tack of formulating and defending
principles in other areas. The intellectual tools of "trashing" would then
be understood as available both for renunciation and for principled normative argument favoring one strategy of governance over another. The
53. This analogy, like that of Critical Legal Studies to guerilla warfare in Binder, supra note 12,
suffers from being what a literary agent recently called "a false analogy." In each case the differences
between the two phenomena being compared so outweigh the points of similarity that the analogy, if
taken seriously, is likely to be more confusing than illuminating. Nevertheless, the comparison does
serve to illustrate a point in each case.
54. This was pointed out in Sparer, supra note 8.
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CLS movement would be encouraged to foster capacity to construct as
well as deconstruct principles, so that the choice between construction
and renunciation could be made tactically based upon a political analysis
of how diverse areas of law differentially redistributed power and
initiative.
The indeterminist program of general renunciation s is usually accompanied by a broader strategy of seeking to delegitimize the existing
legal order as a whole. However, such a strategy is likely to be impeded
by people's affirmative needs to generate mentalities that facilitate their
acquiescence to established power. Very few people would ever have the
capacity to reject the legal order as a whole because of flaws in the cogency and coherence of its ideology. Most strive to believe in its legitimacy because doing so enables them to guide themselves away from selfdestructive conflict without feeling the fear that they would otherwise
need for such internal guidance.
If one truly internalized a burning feeling of illegitimacy that applied to all established symbols of authority one would either need substantial fear to keep "anti-social tendencies" in check, or one would run
amok. A sense of illegitimacy for all authority is sometimes internalized
in a way that is necessarily detached from action. This detachment, far
from being temporary or peripheral, is intrinsic to the type of message
being internalized. Far more common than detached general renunciation though, is the tendency to embrace one or more aspects of institutional legitimacy, and to justify political opposition by positing a clash
between these aspects and others. So, for example, people will identify
with the president, but oppose taxes that make the president's government possible; they will be against big government, but favor the United
States; they will despise bureaucracy, but respect the particular bureaucracy which is their employer. Reformist liberals do something like this
when they champion civil liberties law, but criticize laws that sustain and
exacerbate disparities in wealth. Radical indeterminists do it when they
display a passionate attachment to legal academia's primary value of coherent, rigorous argumentation and set this value off against established
forms of legal doctrine.
55. The reunciation, which has to some extent been presented under the banner of an "irrationalist" school of thought, is directed principally at attempts to formulate legal principles, illustrate
the ordered nature of legal doctrine or mobilize political energies in support of specific legal reforms,
For one of the clearest statements of the position, see Dalton, Review of the Politicsof Law, 6 HARV.
WOMEN'S. L. J.229 (1983); see also, Freeman, Truth and Mystification in Legal Scholarship, 90
YALE L. J.1229 (1981).
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In other words, the very thing that legitimizes and makes possible
opposition to some aspects of the social order is the belief that these aspects are contrary to other aspects. This belief allows for the simultaneous satisfaction of desires for collective rebellion and identification with
symbols of authority. In theory, one might satisfy the deep ambivalence
by rejecting law and accepting other symbols of authority. But because
law is so closely connected with the coercive power of the state, a consciousness that rejected it in more than a detached way would fail to
satisfy the underlying self-protective need. Hence, any movement that is
a serious contender for power and influence must either perceive itself as
fundamentally lawful, or exist in the context of a near-total breakdown of
the state's coercive power. Seeking to build an oppositional movement by
rejecting all law would deprive the movement of a major source of its
own internal legitimacy and collective identification. Hence critics of radical indeterminacy correctly assert that its renunciation of law risks "de56
moralizing" social movements.
Instead of rejecting legal authority in toto, social movements bringing change generally aggregate elements of legitimacy in the hope of ultimately being able to depict their opponents as outlaws. Thus, belief in a
legal principle of free speech may be coupled with faith in the moral
validity of the movement's cause and indignance at opponents' repressive
tactics; all in an attempt to assert the movement's superior legitimacy.
The greater the movement's success, the more it comes to be defended by
interventions of the state; the more the lawful processes of legitimation
become a vehicle of social change.5 7 To view legitimation as an inherently conservative force is to hypostatize a particular historical period
where conservatism is ascendant into a universal condition.
If social change occurs principally by reorienting the dominant
forms of legitimation in favor of a movement's program, then a broad
strategy of across-the-board delegitimizing of legal authority can have
only limited success. One might say that to facilitate social change it is
not enough to reject the law, one must change the law-such change
being the only potent way of delegitimizing society's repressive forces.
But such change depends upon legitimation of progressive movements.
Existing law can plausibly be viewed as a sprawling amalgam of liberal social democratic and corporate or conservative ordering strategies,
differentially reflected in various bodies of doctrine. If one believes that a
56. See Sparer, supra note 8.
57. See Kairys, Freedom ofSpeech, in THE POLITICS OF LAW (D. Kairys ed. 1982); F. PIVEN &
R. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS 186-264 (1979); KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1975).
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useful way to reorient legitimacy in favor of social movements is to
strengthen social democratic tendencies in the law while undercutting
conservative ones, then one is likely to favor using renunciation only as a
tactic against corporatist doctrines rather than as a general program applied even-handedly against corporatist and social democratic alike.
By conceiving of change in ways that are excessively voluntaristic,,
advocates of renunciation underestimate the importance of social structure in the process of change. They pay insufficient attention to the defensive aspects of progressive change and view legal principles simply as
ends, rather than as means and ends both."8 They overlook or too
quickly dismiss the political diversity that is represented in existing legal
doctrine, and especially fail to see that different doctrinal areas may represent varying preponderances of divergent ordering strategies, some
more progressive than others. Thus, some legal principles may be worth
concretizing and defending because they are consonant with relatively
desirable forms of political evolution. This is especially true during periods of reaction when society's conservative forces seek to undo past
gains, and legal principles serve to increase institutional resistance to undersirable changes.
Radical indeterminists' ability to overcome this critique necessarily
depends upon their having some theory of motivational psychology that
translates the experience of discovering legal doctrine's apparent indeterminacy into a shared movement-generating passion for change. Merely
arguing that legal rights sometimes give only illusory protection does not
suffice for two reasons. First, no one in CLS has ever been able to demonstrate that legal rights are always unimportant-indeed to assert that
First Amendment rights have no real significance for political organizing
seems implausible. And even if rights were always illusory or unimportant, it is quite possible that the illusion of their efficacy would do more
to foster radical political movements than would a belief in law being
nothing more than a disguise for arbitrary exertions of power.
Any sort of political radicalism will necessarily confront certain disincentives. People's careers can be jeopardized, promotions imperiled by
controversy, and if either the radicalism or reaction in society proceeds
far enough, legal scholars may find themselves on the wrong side of the
law. Given these possibilities, there must be some strong motivating force
to make scholars want to brave the risks. Right away we are confronted
with the task of articulating a theory of political motivation. We want
58. See Matsuda, supra note 8; Crenshaw, supra note 8.
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our conceptual basis of radicalism, be it CLS or TLS, to guide us in directions that our theory of political motivation tells us will energize and
expand radical activity.
Of course, it may not be clear whose motivation the theory must
address, since one of the main ways political people are sustained is by
finding a constituency of sympathetizers who perceive their own needs
and aspirations as being promoted by their political activity. But regardless of whether motivation is seen as necessary only within legal
academia or beyond it, some general points can be made.
Theories of political motivation are a sore spot for most CLS writers, so one does not often find them being articulated. Usually, they are
either implicit in exhortations for change or altogether absent. One of the
clearest and best statements of the motivational theory underlying the
CLS-indeterminacy approach was authored by Clare Dalton several
years ago.5 9 Having rejected the proposed motivational theory of two
critics60 for being simply "convictions personal to the authors," Dalton
writes:
Imagine instead beginning with the premise that critique is itself a supremely constructive enterprise, exposing the constraints that inhibit us
from reimagining our world in a way that is not dominated by the contradiction that it is our historical circumstance to see as fundamental. Imagine
critique as a powerful device for stripping away from us, ifwe choose, the
legal abstractionsby which we order our perceptions, leaving us groping, to

be sure, but forced to deploy whatever other means of decision are available
to us, and with at least the hope of making something new of our experience. Imagine that instead of appealing to its audience in the name of
"grand design," the claim of critique is simply that, to the extent it influences the audience's experience of and activity within society, in ways suggested by the critique, it stands validated. Imagine the possibility that those
who embraced the experience and felt changed by it, would feel the desire
to act with others towards social transformation in the name of a continto association rather than isolation and conflict. (emphagent commitment
61
sis added)
Dalton asks why these imaginings are "any less convincing ' 62 than
others. My answer is that the motivational theory implicit in them seems
excessively rationalistic and abstracted from human experience to the
point of being perhaps a bit naive. 63 The implicit theory seems to be that
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Dalton, supra note 55, at 241.
Hutchinson & Monahan, supra note 8.
Dalton, supra note 55, at 241-42.
Id. at 242.
Conservatives periodically have attacked CLS scholars for being naive about human nature.
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people, if free, one, would want to reimagine the world in ways that foster greater closeness ("association" rather than "isolation") among people; two, but they are prevented from doing so by embracing "legal
abstractions" which order their perceptions and make them think of existing social relations as natural and necessary; three, because their embrace of these abstractions is conditioned on a shared belief in their
intellectual cogency, critique aimed at showing the incoherence of legal
doctrine can break the spell of the abstractions and empower people to
begin transforming the world.
If this theory were valid, then exposing legal doctrine's philosophical incoherence would constitute effective radical political practice almost irrespective of the particular doctrine being exposed. However,
there are some problems with the theory. First, the strong, principled
commitment to intellectual cogency does not exist in the consciousness of
most people, or even most law students. The primary reason that most
people acquiesce in existing hierarchies and social relations is not that
they believe no other forms are possible-a simple reading of National
Geographic magazine would probably tell them otherwise-but that they
face real threats and coercion if they do not conform, and receive actual
rewards if they do. People sometimes adopt rationalizations about existing social relations being natural, necessary, or the best ones possible,
as a way of guiding themselves to conform. But this is probably because
conformity is seen as in their own best interests for other, more tangible
reasons. To attack only the rationalizations and to do so in highly intellectualized fashion is not likely to break any spells since the underlying
sources of the desire to conform are left intact.
The harder but also more important question is how to neutralize
the capacities of those wielding power to administer the punishments and
rewards that compel obedience. For this, collective action is undoubtedly
necessary, since individuals who try to do it alone will almost certainly
be sanctioned. If no mass support for their disobedience is forthcoming
from others, then the lesson that all will learn is simply one of reinforcing
the need to obey existing authority.
Sometimes this attack takes the form of claims that people are necessarily "selfish." See, e.g., Note,
The Faith of "Crits" CriticalLegal Studies and Human Nature, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 433
(1988). However, an important distinction should be drawn between selfishness in the sense of caring
only about one's own personal gain or welfare and experiential groundedness, which sees people's
political commitments coming out of things that are experienced as unjust or oppressive in their or
their clients' daily lives. Because people are capable of generating gratification for themselves when
they act altruistically, "selfishness" is a particular, historically contingent expression of human capacities rather than a fixed trait of human nature.
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Some advantage is to be gained by delegitimizing rulers' familiar
uses of symbols and ideologies that are commonly employed to cajole
acquiescence. But such delegitimation requires that the rulers' rhetoric
be rendered shameful and outrageous-ideally to the point of making
them want to abandon it for fear of adverse reactions. Mere demonstrations of philosophical incoherence, or worse yet, mere showing of historical contingency and social situatedness, are not likely to turn the trick
because such incoherence and situatedness are the normal ways that
most human beings communicate with each other most of the time. To
sustain outrage against these, we would have to embark on the difficult
task of being perpetually at war with everything around us. To rely on
such an approach immediately presents us with a dilemma. Either our
audience is sophisticated, in which case they will probably know that we
are simply calling on them to become enraged at the human condition, or
they are not sophisticated, in which case the whole corpus of demonstrations of philosophical incoherence, fundamental contradiction and the
like, are likely to either mean little or feed into stereotypes about bumbling, long-winded intellectuals.
A much more effective way of undercutting authority and weakening the hold of its favored ideologies is to show that its exercise is historically contingent not only in the abstract sense of being simply one
possible way of ordering experience, but also in the very immediate sense
of being poised on the verge of actual disintegration. The effects of such
demonstrations can be powerful indeed, but they require large numbers
of people acting in concert. Once they have been achieved, they are likely
to be applauded by many people (as well as condemned by many others)
but until then, the necessary mass participation is likely to be forestalled
by fear. Thus, the key question is how to help people overcome their fear
so that they may proceed in groups to bring about the desired change.
It is at this point that the human, mammalian, instinctual machinery of rage-inducing territorial and protective responses becomes pertinent.' Unlike the computers they have invented, people are guided
heavily by their passions. Foremost among these is the aggressive-defensive territorial response that in the state of nature arose only in response
to immediate physical threats, but has since been sublimated into a capacity for outraged response to either perceived injustices, or perceived
contingent future threats to a way of life.6 5
64.

See S.

FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS

RISING (1983); E. 0. WILSON, ON HUMAN NATURE (1978).

65. See id.

(1961); R. A. WILSON,
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This primitive anger response is an indispensable component of radical political energies. Once triggered in a sustained and recurring way, it
helps to block out fear by affording politically activated people the strong
gratification that comes from satisfying emotionally predominant aggressive impulses. Long-term conceptions of individual interest (for example,
worrying about career advancement) are cast aside in favor of a commitment to either principles of justice or long-term conceptions of collective
interest, because such cognitive maneuvers facilitate the pressing immediate interest of affording the desired gratification. It is this type of mass
emotional turnabout that is roughly described by the term "radicalization." The capacity of any critique to either inspire such a response, or
defuse it once it is occurring is what I mean by the term moralforce.
Not every type of critique or exposure of hypocrisy is likely to have
the moral force needed to trigger shared outrage. Whether any given critique will be successful depends less on the all-encompassing, seemingly
fundamental nature of its target than on the strength of people's personal
stake in what is being betrayed and the vitality of popularly held ideologies sensitizing people to notice and collectively respond to the betrayal.
Curiously, the same types of situations that will tempt many people
to turn against an ideology and develop means of disassociating themselves from it are also likely to create circumstances where, if the ideology were used critically rather than abandoned, it would have significant
moral force. For example, the spectacle of liberals in positions of power
and authority betraying fundamental precepts of liberalism might make
liberalism appear very unattractive and thereby spawn things like CLS
attacks on liberalism. But what may be passing almost unnoticed underneath the polarization is the potential for widely held liberal ideas to
serve as catalysts for outrage against the betrayal.
If the CLS-indeterminacy approach is to be a generator of political
radicalism, then it must have the potential to foster and catalyze enraged
responses to the perceived injustices of social order. It must show its
metal not merely in establishing certain types of intellectual superiority,
but in the highly passionate process of making the exercise of existing
authority shameful, of stimulating rage at injustice, and thereby generating widespread symbolic disobedience. The critique must have strong
moral force.
Will the mere showing of historical contingency or philosophical incoherence in legal doctrine have sufficient moral force to inspire mass
radicalization? There are grounds for skepticism. Because we regularly
tolerate incoherence and seldom condition our obedience on any careful
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scrutiny of analytical cogency, demonstrations of the manipulability of
legal doctrine and of the hypocrisy of those who speak in extreme formalist language will not provoke great rage. While such demonstrations
may theoretically induce those who wield authority to speak in more sophisticated, carefully qualified ways, this is a far cry from inspiring the
type of radical movement for which many CLS leaders have yearned.
What then might be a better role for legal intellectuals wanting to promote radical change? Perhaps it would be to identify potential areas of
enraged response, and to undertake the combined legal-factual investigations to help translate that response into some sort of intellectually and
emotionally powerful critique. Such efforts must be guided by theory, but
the question is, what kind of theory?
Following an effort to summarize several facets of the CLS-indeterminacy approach, I will argue that by the test just suggested, liberalism is
worth a great deal and Critical Legal Studies-indeterminacy theory very
little. Because people's propensities for enraged response to injustice are
conditioned by prevailing ideologies, and because liberalism is the most
politically promising of our widely-held ideologies, it makes sense for
radicals to view liberalism not as something to be swept away, but as a
guide for figuring out where popular anger and critiques with strong
moral force may properly be forthcoming. The CLS-indeterminacy approach is an inadequate substitute for liberalism in two respects. Because
it fails to focus on any particular form of injustice or oppression that
would outrage anyone, it is left to rely on Dalton's inadequate theory of
political motivation, and is not likely to be politically effective as a result.
But even if it were, it might be counterproductive, since its main import
could be either to further obscure the sources of rage, or to diminish their
force by lowering people's expectations.
Six animating ideas have guided efforts to build a Critical Legal
Studies movement around the idea of legal indeterminacy (hereafter the
CLS movement). These are:
1. The idea of an intellectual-political practice built around a project of
relentlessly exposing the incoherence or indeterminacy of legal
doctrine.66
67
2. The emphasis on law as legitimation of injustice.
66. See R. UNGER, supra note 19; Dalton, supranote 55; Freeman, supra note 55. For critique
see Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: CritiquingCriticalDogma, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 462 (1987).
67. See, e.g., Freeman, Legitimizing Racial DiscriminationThrough Anti-discriminationLaw: A
CriticalReview ofSupreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978); Klare, JudicialDeradicalization of the WagnerAct andthe OriginsofModern Legal Consciousness,1937-1941, 62 MINN. L.
REV. 245 (1978); Gabel, Reification in Legal Reasoning, 3 Ras. IN LAW & Soc. 25 (1980).
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3. The view of legal rights as primarily vehicles for the dissemination of
false consciousness and political passivity.68
4. The idea of a political movement emanating from law schools, and
the concommitant idea of legal intellectuals as initiating transformative
processes by shattering repressive conceptual structures.6 9
5. The strategy of not articulating specific reforms or programs of
transformation, but of endorsing either spontaneous, unguided local action and generalized opposition to hierarchy on the one hand, or abstract, intellectualized "total critique" on the other. 70
6. The idea of law as intrinsically political and as properly shaped by
extra-judicial, extra-legal action such as the various forms of civil disobedience that have catalyzed the emergence of contemporary civil rights
and First Amendment protection.71
The last of these is shared by CLS, TLS and other approaches. From
the perspective of trying to foster political radicalism it should be considered the least controversial of the six ideas since there is little reason to
believe that important social change of any sort can be brought about
without exerting significant political pressure. Because flagrant disobedience is a principal means of generating pressure on law makers, whose
profession requires them to be concerned about both legitimacy and enforceability, extra-legal activities-whether of black people no longer
willing to sit in the back of the bus or of millionaires slyly declaring
campaign finance laws to be unworkable-are often indispensable for
change. The important thing is to devise forms of disobedience which
achieve more in the way of mobilizing support or weakening the exercise
of hostile authority than they cost in producing backlash.
Because the CLS movement has adopted theories which are naive
about psychological processes of political change, it has been led to engage in types of disobedience which are misplaced and ultimately
counterproductive. In committing the (fully lawful, but nevertheless jolting) disobedience of attacking the moral sanctity and intellectual cogency
68. See Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousnessand the Pact of the Withdrawn
Selves, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1563 (1984); Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363 (1984);
Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEX. L. REV. 387 (1984).
69. See D. KENNEDY, supra note 17; R. UNGER, supra note 19.
70. For CLS critique of the reformist or "instrumentalist" view, see Gordon, New Developments
in Legal Theory, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 281 (D. Kairys ed. 1982); see also Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1151 (1985); Boyle, supra note 36; Dalton, supra note 55;
Freeman, supra note 55; for discussion and overview see Binder, supra note 12.
71. See Kairys, supra note 57; Gabel & Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical
Legal Theory and the Practiceof Law, 11 N.Y.U. REy. L. & Soc. CHANGE 369 (1982-83).
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of legal doctrine and law generally, the CLS movement has spread its
disobedience too thin. The sheer immensity, and thus the abstractness
and amorphousness, of its target has kept the movement from being able
to inspire much political support. Hence, the disobedience has produced
mainly backlash and has quickly placed CLS on the defensive as the
movement has sought to protect the careers of its younger scholars.72
The first five tenets can be likened to the proverbial primrose path.
They have provided the directions that when followed faithfully lead to a
kind of political futility. Viewed separately, each of the five has a somewhat different status in terms of truth value and validity as a focus for
political organizing. The first tenet positing indeterminacy of legal doctrine has substantial intellectual validity, but so do arguments that its
political significance has been vastly overstated by the CLS movement.
All that is really achieved by this critique is a persuasive redemolition of
antiquated versions of legal formalism, and a challenge to legal scholars
to begin accounting for doctrinal regularities in more contemporary, sophisticated ways. While the indeterminacy of doctrine critique shows
that it is highly unlikely that legal principles could ever be completely
outcome-determinative-an insight that most legal scholars express using the category of "close cases"-it does not negate the prospect of partial outcome-determinativeness, and of stable patterns in law, which are
really all that is necessary to sustain conceptions of legal principle and
Rule of Law.7 3
The second CLS tenet, which sees law mainly as legitimation of injustice, has undeniable validity as a description of one aspect of what law
and legal systems do. But its value in generating political movement is
cast into doubt by the fact that other aspects of law may furnish the more
hopeful takeoff points for political movements, and a generalized denunciation of law and legal rights may impede people's abilities to grasp and
organize around these other aspects. Thus, the generalized notion of law
as "cloak-of-injustice" may represent a poor strategic choice for legal intellectuals seeking to build a political movement.
The third tenet about legal rights functioning mainly as mystifiers
and sources of political pacification is fundamentally mistaken in three
72. See Gordon, Law and Ideology, 3 TIKKUN 14 (1988); The New McCarthyism, NEWSLETTER
OF THE CONFERENCE ON CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (July 1988) (available in SUNY at Buffalo Law
School Library); Frug, McCarthyism and CriticalLegal Studies, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 665
(1987); NEWSLETTER OF THE CONFERENCE ON CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (May 1988) (available in
SUNY at Buffalo Law School Library).
73. See Herzog, supra note 6; Finnis, supra note 8; Solum, supra note 66.
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respects. Stemming largely from Peter Gabel's "critique of rights consciousness,"'7 4 it embraces, somewhat unwittingly I suspect, the positivist
conception of legal rights as being simply that which courts positively
pronounce and accord people. So by definition, "rights consciousness"
comes to mean adopting a stance of political passivity and waiting for
courts to tell us what our rights are. However, if "rights" are accorded
greater depth and viewed as existing among the people and as part of
political culture, then there exists the possibility of contrary interpretations and claims of right becoming a focus of dispute between people and
the government." Such disputes, which are necessarily premised on according rights a greater degree of moral seriousness than CLS leaders are
wont, are likely to generate anything but passivity.
Similarly, the individual character of the rights that have been most
fully developed in our legal system leads Gabel to believe that people
focus on rights works primarily to divide them from one another. In actuality, a common deprivation or threatened deprivation of the individual rights possessed by members of a group can be an important basis of
group solidarity, since it is the kind of thing that will trigger anger in
many people simultaneously. Also, when government and courts reliably accord and protect rights this can help people to overcome the fear
that is the strongest inhibitor of political action.
Finally, the old error of confounding correlation and causation
seems to plague Gabel's analysis. He has observed movements in their
declining phase when popular energies have ebbed and what has been left
is a residue of movement lawyers trying to preserve (or expand) the
movement's achievements through litigation. Since these efforts are likely
to be decreasingly successful over time, they are apt to become a focus of
demoralization. But probably other factors depleting movement energies
are more responsible for the movement's decline. Rather than being the
principal cause of decline, rights-oriented litigation efforts far more likely
have become the most visible residue because movements have declined
the easiest aspects
for other reasons. Rights-oriented litigation is one of
76
of movements to preserve during periods of decline.
The fourth and fifth tenets, which together portray law schools as
74. See Gabel, supra note 68.
75. See, e.g., D. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE IN
AMERICA (1987); Kairys, supra note 57; Letter to Colleagues, infra at 96-110.
76. See Matsuda, supra note 8. My own observation of the decline of 1960's movements includes
the following: the Civil Rights Movement relied heavily on the rhetoric of rights and declined
through the 1970's. The Antiwar Movement relied heavily on the rhetoric of duty and declined even
more precipitously through the 1970's.

1990]

CLS AND THE RULE OF LAW

centers of initiative and eschew reformism, are where the politics of CLS
go most awry. The anti-reformist tilt is related to the CLS rejection of
liberalism; both stem from an understandable (and perhaps wellfounded) desire not to be drawn into the highly degraded, corrupt forms
of mainstream politics that have been prevalent in recent years. But they
also have significant costs in precluding CLS scholars from developing
any sort of political base in the wider society.
What then results is a looking inward to the micro-politics of law
school teaching, and a detachment from other, broader struggles in society. Both the detachment and the rejection of reformism receive rhetorical justification from CLS slogans about fundamentally transforming the
nature of social relations to produce community rather than isolation
and alienation. But there is reason to suspect that the very dichotomy
between "reformism" and "transformation" or "community" may be
self-defeating because it is through shared struggle over common reformist aims that political community is most likely to be forged. 7 To begin
with, an aim of total transformation seems more like a way of routing
oneself away from political involvement toward solitary intellectualization.
If CLS-indeterminacy theory achieved political ascendance as the
primary form of radical political activity in law schools, what would
emerge is neither nihilism nor authoritarian socialism, but simply foregone opportunities and critique without moral force. Ironically, the
moral weakness of CLS criticism stems partly from proponents' tendency
to overlook some of the basic precepts of traditional law teaching. Four
errors that I would highlight are: one, a lack of appreciation of the legal
concept of standing; two, an abandonment of the metaprinciple that legal
doctrine is meaningful only in relation to facts; three, an unwillingness to
explore what traditionalists mean by the concept of arbitrariness; four,
lack of interest in the concept of Rule of Law. Hence, critique should
proceed by means of a continuous going back and forth between relevant
doctrine and pertinent facts rather than take the form of being a global
assault on doctrine generally.
The suggestion that such traditional concepts might have great
77. People in CLS have correctly determined that development of emotionally engaged political
communities is central to any radical's task. Having termed the desired emotional engagement "intersubjective zap," they tend to proclaim it as a good in itself and studiously avoid discussions about
what types of political issues are likely to generate such feelings. For example, opposition to the
Vietnam War was an instance of reformism, but the experience of opposing the country's war
machine in order to bring about an end to the war produced a lot of intersubjective zap.
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value in guiding efforts to generate political radicalism should not be entirely surprising. For centuries, law as an institution has been heavily
influenced by the goal of preserving political stability. It has developed
conceptual ways of identifying where disruption is likely to occur so appropriate palliative responses can be designed. But it is at least plausible
that some of these same diagnostic concepts can be employed by those
wishing to promote radicalization. Consider, for example, the most basic
idea of standing-that of injury in fact.
In litigation it has traditionally been assumed that cases are not to
be adjudicated unless there is a specific, identifiable injury in fact, and
persons who have suffered such an injury are themselves before the court.
Disputes that involve an actual or an imminently threatened injury with
ascertainable causes are more likely to generate strong moral feelings and
thereby jeopardize social stability. It is an efficient allocation of scarce
judicial resources to allow courts to focus only on disputes of this type.
Similarly, if our goal is an efficient allocation of political organizing
talent and radical theory-writing skill in order to foster political movements, it would make sense to orient one's efforts around issues where we
can identify the injury in fact, and use it as a basis for generating moral
force. While we ought not to choose injuries that are highly unusual and
thus of concern to only small numbers of people, the injury should, even
if contingent and highly generalized, be specifically identifiable and amenable to analysis in terms of some model of causation.
Compare the totality of anomie and alienation in society that the
CLS critique attributes to liberal legal social order with the risk of nuclear war that unfortunately has grown substantially in the last decade.
Stated with extreme brevity, the nuclear story is one of the American
people repeatedly being presented gross falsifications of the strategic situation by government officials and candidates in order to trick them into
supporting massive arms buildup, deployment of strategically unstable
"first-strike" weaponry, and further technological advance in the destructiveness and rapid deliverability of weapons.7 8 All of these developments substantially increase the risk of nuclear war by miscalculation,
which is a far greater risk than that of premeditated Soviet attack as a
result of American weakness.79 These facts have enormous implications
for the meaning of "national security," for discussion of the nation's secrecy laws, and for the need to devise insitutionalized means by which
78.
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FOR SANITY,

NUCLEAR WAR (1987).
79. See T. GERVASI, supra note 50.
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the people can effectively demand more truthful information from government. Given the magnitude of destruction that would be caused by
nuclear war, the fact that the demonstrable risk is much greater than
most people imagine, and the stark contradictions between prevailing liberal democratic theory and the ways in which public support has been
gotten for arms buildup, there is an opportunity here to develop critiques
possessing great moral force. These in turn might raise interesting questions of law reform, given people's universal interest in avoiding nuclear
war.
Virtually no CLS leaders have shown any interest in moving in this
direction or even supporting others who would. 0 Radicalism rooted in
CLS-indeterminacy theory has tended to focus instead on corporate capitalist social order as a whole, and on the ostensible role of legal doctrine
in sustaining it by depriving people of the ability to think about radically
different alternatives. However, the focus on totality mitigates against the
discovery of any specific injury in fact, since the amorphous psychic costs
of alienated social order may well not be perceived as specific injuries by
those affected. Even if they were, the questions of causality would be so
complicated as to preclude development of the type of finger-pointing
theories that are likely to have substantial moral force.
If CLS proponents wrote from the perspective of seeing themselves
not as abstract, universal transformers of social order, but as particular
individuals aggrieved by and seeking to redress particular harms, then
issues like the nuclear arms race might well find more of a place in proponents' universe of pertinent critical legal activity. Similarly, by adopting other social groups as clients for purposes of radical critique, CLS
writers could invoke the suffering and injustice visited on these groups to
generate moral force in their critiques.
Critiques of this type necessarily involve a close interplay between
law and facts. Criticism cannot be of legal doctrine as a purely abstract,
universal enterprise that is deemed socially harmful in one respect or
another. Instead the focus must be on how particular bodies of factual
evidence show particular areas of legal decisionmaking to be contrary to
deeply rooted notions of justice or proper governmental functioning. It
would thus be desirable to redefine legal education away from being a
specialized discipline strictly organized around analysis of appellate opinions, toward including factual investigations pertinent to politically
80. One does, however, find some among participants at CLS conferences. See National Conference on Critical Legal Studies (Washington, D.C. 1988) (talk by A. Scales, on feminism and
disarmament).
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charged topics where injustice and irrationality have become extreme.
Some of this is occurring among participants at CLS conferences, but it
occurs in spite of, rather than because of, the efforts of CLS leaders to
build a political movement around the idea of indeterminacy of doctrine.
A third way in which traditional approaches to law seem superior to
CLS-indeterminacy theory is in the respective way that each group uses
the term "arbitrary." Among CLS proponents, the strict dichotomy between formalism and formlessness results in the term "arbitrary" being
deployed against any judicial outcome that is not strictly determined by
formalist logic. Consequently, CLS proponents are able to argue that
most judicial outcomes are "arbitrary." But what is obscured in the process is the more politically engaged way in which traditionalists use the
term. "Arbitrary," for them, connotes decisions that are manifestly improper when seen in terms of either people's underlying expectations or
principles that are generally understood to guide an area of decisionmaking. To grasp this more politically explosive meaning of the term we must
see arbitrariness not as the usual course of most legal decisions, and we
must take more seriously than most CLS leaders do, the possibility of
using Rule of Law as a critical concept.
C. Liberal Legal Concepts as Bases for Effective Nihilism: Marijuana
Laws and the First Amendment
The term "Rule of Law" frequently is contrasted with the idea of
arbitrary, illegitimate exercise of power or naked use of force. Rule of
Law's essence consists of two things. First, there must be sufficient doctrinal regularity that people may reasonably form expectations about
what the law will or will not allow.8" This enables people to adjust their
conceptions of fairness and justice to be largely in line with the outcomes
prescribed by legal institutions. Second, exertions of state power must be
connected with and based upon shared, underlying values or moral principles that help to frame compliance-inducing dialogue. By having this
common starting point, people can come to view law as something that
82
protects rather than oppresses or annoys them.
81. See L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964). The regularity must be both of a procedural or formal sort, and of a substantive nature, so that clients and attorneys are not left with the
belief that decisions are not wholly arbitrary or made without regard to weight of precedent. Id. For
discussion of requirements of Rule of Law and failure of CLS critique to demonstrate that they
cannot be met, see Bellioti, The Rule ofLaw and the CriticalLegal Studies Movement, 24 U. WESTERN ONT. L. REv. 67 (1986).
82. The conservative philosopher most prominently associated with the "Rule of Law" idea is
Friedrich Hayek. See F. HAYEK:, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944). While Hayek entertained a
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To take the Rule of Law seriously as a critical concept we must
recall that things are often not as they seem. If pronouncements of courts
and other government officials are taken at face value, our legal order
appears to be founded on certain basic principles, many of them embedded in our constitution. We are always being reassured by officials who
reassert the basic principles by using them to justify policies. But what if
the policies were really there not for their stated ostensible purposes, but
because of a manipulated hysteria that confuses people and allows irrational prejudices to be used in furtherance of state tyranny?
What if the constitutionally legitimate bases of policy were connected with the actual policies purely by a series of lies? What if the
government's action is such that if it were honestly portrayed by Congress, or the courts, it would clearly be unconstitutional, yet extreme
forms of demagogy and misinformation allow it to masquerade as law?
Under these circumstances the action stands condemned as a fraudulent
exercise of the Rule of Law, and the true rule coupled with adequate
factual information will serve as a basis for exposing the imposter.
A typical first response to this scenario is that it must be unlikely
because it presupposes government officials to be nefarious and conspiratorial. But that is not true. The same lapsing into mass delusion abetted
by governmental manipulation can result from what we are now experiencing in several policy areas, which is an institutionalized breakdown in
the societal processing and dissemination of information ("a failure of
83
collective intelligence").
To the extent such breakdown occurs, people may be left with the
same intuitive moral commitments that underlie our Constitution, but be
led to support policies that are highly subversive of principles to which
they themselves adhere. Under these circumstances, dialogue that emphasizes the importance of philosophical integrity in the Rule of Law
and contrasts the underlying liberal principles with repressive laws resting on disinformation will be likely to provide one of the strongest vehicles for inspiring political resistance.
To propose using the Rule of Law as a basis for nihilism might at
first sound absurdly contradictory. But if we face a somewhat urgent imperative of separating bonafide lawmaking from laws that are imposters
number of formalist fantasies of the sort which have been correctly criticized by CLS scholars, he
also more intriguingly presented the idea of common law reflecting embedded customs and principles of a culture. See id.
83. See J. Blum, The Health of the State (unpublished manuscript) (comparing processes of
intellectual breakdown in policies pertaining to the nuclear arms race and war on drugs).
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in the sense previously described, then nihilism and the true rule may
have a temporary, situationally determined, close affinity. Nihilism is the
forceful unmasking and delegitimizing of inauthentic, fraudulent and oppressive rule. If done well, it does not seek to undermine everything in a
society. Rather it separates the noble, virtuous and true aspects from the
illegitimate, using the former as a source of moral outrage to be deployed
against the latter. Hence its destructive power has an implicit affirmative
quality; either that, or it has very little power at all.
In criticizing the limited political potential of CLS-indeterminacy
theory, I have argued that traditional liberal legal concepts offer a
stronger basis for moral critique, even of a radical or nihilist nature, than
does CLS. In order to demonstrate both the possibility of such critique,
and the fact that it can have a moral force that dwarfs that of CLS, I will
apply the traditional, nearly consensually held principles underlying the
First Amendment-which is one of the main doctrinal foundations of
our conception of Rule of Law-to the nation's marijuana laws and recent governmental attempts to inspire stepped-up enforcement of them. I
will present the argument in the form of a hypothetical letter to colleagues, since that presents a better vehicle for demonstrating moral force
than does the typical law review format that favors detached, relatively
passionless argumentation.
Dear Colleagues,
I am writing to you as one of the nation's approximately twenty-five
million pot smokers. This is a group with which I feel an increasing sense
of identification based on our facing a common threat of thinly veiled
religious persecution."4 Our difficulties are partly legal-the newly enacted ten thousand dollar fines and federal loan cutoffs for possession of
even a single joint 8 5 --partly procedural-the government threatening to
confiscate our automobiles and expel us from our homes without even
the usual due process hearings,86 and partly political-the government
conducting a gigantic "hate and fear" campaign against us over the airwaves, using a crude mixture of displaced racial stereotypes and pro84. See text accompanying notes 85-113.
85. Anti-drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, §§ 5301, 6486; 102 Stat. 4181, 4310,

4384 (1988).
86. See, eg., Johnson, Vermont PondersSpirit of the Law on Drugs, N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1989,
at 18, col. 5. (neighbors protesting the confiscation of a farm where family grew pot for personal use).
In the government publication, A NATIONAL DRUG STRATEGY (1989), which President Bush held
up to his national audience, the proposal is made to extend asset forfeitures statutes to casual users of
illict drugs generally.
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jected hypochondria.8 7
If the truth be told, we include in our ranks a disproportionate
number of your brightest and most creative people, but like the
scapegoated groups of various totalitarian regimes, we are slandered, disdained and reviled as shameful creatures. Most of you think our plight
has nothing to do with religious persecution, but that is because you
think about us very little. If you thought more, you would realize the
root of our difficulties: we are veterans, descendants and beneficiaries of a
cultural movement, commonly known as "the counterculture," which
dared to put forth an alternative vision of the good life, and of salvation
in the here and now. Many of us have shunned either quietly or openly
the Calvinist anxieties by which you guide yourselves-the constant
yearning for status, for recognition, for material advancement, all of
which is nothing more than the four hundred year-old need for confirmation that one is among the elect destined for the kingdom of heaven.
We, by contrast, have discovered salvation to be a more genial and
enjoyable pursuit-to be sought by getting high, through frolic and
laughter, and by creative pursuits. By daring to seek momentary salvation with an herb you find Spanish and alien, we have offended many of
your deep-seated religious feelings and have caused the more irritable
among you to begin planning a reign of persecution.
You persecute us and force us to sign oaths because you believe that
we have a fundamentally different relation to God than you do. But for a
moment be fair: God is merciful and allows great diversity among his
creatures. It is only when you in your human arrogance derogate to
yourselves the task of enforcing what you believe to be his will, that we
find ourselves on the verge of being victimized.
We, by contrast, wish only to be tolerated and to allow each his or
her own preferred means of getting high. For this you deem us heretics
who shall not only receive no protection for our inspiration and pursuit
of spiritual uplift, but shall also bear the blame for most of the country's
ills, and be made to pay under pain of imprisonment in the "user ac87. Compare the measured, realistic accounts of various alleged health risks in Hollister, infra
note 96, with the following alarmist proclamations being distributed as part of the U.S. Customs
Service "Drug Awareness Program." Marijuana is depicted as having "unpredictable potency" (despite impossibility of overdose), as being "addictive," as "lethal in lungs" (despite absence of any
documented fatalities), as "genetic roulette" (despite absence of evidence of birth defects) and as
"chang[ing] brain function" in ways that are "accurately" portrayed by terms such as "bum-outs,"
"air-heads," and "space-cadets." U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE, MARIJUANA-THE GATEWAY DRUG
(1987).
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countability" programs of your tyrannical state.a Perhaps you think
your government's attitude of "zero tolerance" and its plans to eradicate
our culture have nothing to do with religious persecution. If so, there are
two possibilities. One is that I am crazy, and the other is that you are
stupid. Let us decide on the fair battleground of the facts.
Have you ever wondered why marijuana is illegal? Have you wondered why the courageous kids who bring us our contraband get
"mandatory-minimum" sentences of fifteen and twenty years, 8 9 and why
our younger people are being forced to sign oaths disavowing any association with our practices? 90 Have you wondered why our country is experiencing a four-fold increase in its prison population, principally
because of "drug use" in a society where almost everyone is a drug user
of one sort or another?9 1 Have you wondered why plans are being laid for
elaborate surveillance schemes, including the hiring of informants, so
that we may be more actively persecuted? What is the purpose of this
war that is being waged, you think, against inanimate objects on behalf of

purity and holiness, but in fact, is being waged against us?
"To protect you," some of you will no doubt declare. But protect us
from what? There are two possibilities-to protect us from medical harm
and to protect us from sin. But this "sin" is nothing more than our determination to reach for the divine in our own way, and this "protection" is

plainly nothing more than unjust persecution in disguise. So, either the
medical harms you suppose are real, or you and the politicians you ally
88. The Controlled Substances Penalties Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat.
2068, authorized pretrial detention, lengthened drug sentences to 20 years and increased use of criminal forfeitures. The 1986 Anti-drug Abuse Act included a doubling of funds for the War on Drugs,
mandatory minimum prison terms for many drug crimes, and the creation of new offenses, including
money-laundering. See Anti-drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986)
(amending scattered titles of U.S.C.). The 1988 Act added $10,000 fines for casual users possessing
any amount of any illegal drug and set up provisions for money to be earmarked for a special fund to
hire informants and purchase computerized equipment for use in the war on drugs. See Anti-drug
Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, §§ 5301, 6486, 102 Stat. 4181, 4310, 4384 (1988). Section
5301 is entitled "Denial of Federal Benefits to Drug Trafficers and Possessors," and section 6486 is
entitled "Civil Penalty for Possession of Small Amounts of Controlled Substances." Section 6072,
entitled "Department of Justice Asset Forfeiture Fund," poses the distinct possibility of persecution
of pot smokers becoming a sustained, self-funding endeavor by earmarking confiscated property and
funds.
89. See note 88, supra.
90. This is now common practice on most university campus's as a result of the 1988 Act. See
note 88, supra.
91. Apart from the twenty-five million regular pot smokers and fifty million Americans who
have tried illicit drugs in recent years, it is estimated that the nation has about one hundred-twenty
million alcohol drinkers, and fifty-six million people addicted to tobacco. A. TREBACH, supra note
22, at 3.
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with are self-deluding barbarians who proclaim yourselves modem and
rational while lacking the decency and manners to keep your worst aggressive upsurges in check.
What do the facts tell us? If you bother to consult them, a surprising
constellation will emerge. We are being persecuted for essentially the

same set of reasons that the French Monarch Louis XIV revoked the
Edict of Nantes and unleashed waves of renewed persecution of French
Protestants. We are associated with change, with the prospect of a new
world emerging, and for those who are defenders of the old, our peremptory shackling is a matter of national security. Partly for this reason our
devotion is thought to be heretical.
But beware-at this very time that you build your apparatus of enforcement and oppression, a plague is preparing to descend upon your
land. In your mania and your ignorance, you will be unravelling some of
your proudest achievements. Major civil liberties, particularly the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel and Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure have been drastically curtailed.9 2 Widespread urine testing aimed mainly at detecting us, the pot smokers, 93 is
92. Decisions upholding profile searches are part of a continuing pattern. Throughout the
1980's, the Supreme Court has been significantly reducing the scope of the Fourth Amendment in
drug cases.
See, eg., Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79 (1987) (officer's failure to realize the overbreadth of a
search warrant will not invalidate evidence otherwise illegally seized if officer's miscomprehension
was objectively understandable and reasonable); United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S.
532 (1985) (warrantless search of sealed packages held valid after 3 day delay from time of arrest);
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (enunciates "good faith" exception to exclusionary rule,
upholding evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance of search warrant which is later
found to be issued without probable cause); Illinios v. Andreaus, 463 U.S. 765 (1983) (upholds
search of vessels on inland waterways even when no suspicion of wrong-doing exists); Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (dispenses with two-prong Anguilar-Spinelli test to determine whether
informant's lead creates probable cause for search warrent, effectively presumes veracity of anonymous informant's tip); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983) (airport profile valid to detain, detention may be soley for the purpose of investigating possible crime, not for protection of officer);
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (surveillance of suspects through use of radiotracking
beepers upheld); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (in warrantless search of car, no reasonable expectation of privacy in closed container in trunk, where police officer's estimation of probable
cause to believe drugs are present anywhere in vehicle exists); United States v. Mendenhall, 466 U.S.
544 (1980) (validates drug courier profile as reason to detain); United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606
(1977) (warrantless search of international mail by custom agents upheld where drugs are suspected); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1983) (no-knock warrantless search of dwelling upheld
where police believe threat of immediate destruction of evidence is present); United States v. Place,
462 U.S. 696 (1983) (canine sniff tests valid means to detect drugs).
93. Marijuana metabolites are easily detected in urine tests for up to four to six weeks. Cocaine,
by contrast, can only be detected within forty-eight to seventy-two hours after use. See generally A.
HOFFMAN & J. SILVER, STEAL THIS URINE TEST (1987). LSD cannot be detected at all. I have now
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now being imposed on large portions of the population, many of whom
will then face the threat of loss of employment. The President and National Drug Czar have both called on school children to turn in their
parents, relatives and friends to the police for possession of pot or other
94
drugs.

Such drastic enforcement measures, coupled with the fact that so

many of us love to smoke pot and view it as our right, would create a
kind of constitutional crisis even if your government had a bona fide,

compelling state interest in greatly reducing our use of marijuana. The
reason that serious enforcement of marijuana laws constitutes an utter
abandonment of constitutional principles, as opposed to a mere constitu-

tional crisis, is that your government scarcely has even a legitimate, let
alone a compelling, interest in doing this. The laws are arbitrary, tyranni-

cal action-the kind of thing that would surely have repulsed the father
of our country even had he not been one of us. 95 Typically, the reason

given for upholding the invasions of personal liberty that come from laws
prohibiting use of recreational drugs is that people need protection from
the adverse health and safety effects of addictive or highly dangerous substances. Marijuana, however, is far less addictive, considerably safer, and

significantly less harmful in long-term degenerative effects than either al-

cohol or tobacco.9 6 Because it lacks any addictive substance like the nicoheard several reports that enlisted men have been switching in droves from pot to acid as a result of
mandatory random urine testing.
94. When President Bush gave his television address on Sept. 5, 1989, he called on Americans
"not to look the other way" but to aid forces of law enforcement when they discovered drugs being
used or sold. Drug Czar William Bennet was quoted as encouraging children to turn in parents and
siblings to the police for using or possessing drugs. See Drug Czar Urges Pupils to Turn in Parents,
Say It's Not Snitching, L.A. Times, May 18, 1989, at A2, col.l.
95. See Klinger, Who was ourFirstPotheadPresident?,Weekly World News, Oct. 4, 1988, at 21
(reporting publication of a book by two historians from Barbados documenting George Washington's practice of growing and using marijuana).
Washington's habit of getting stoned had previously received strong circumstantial documentation in an appendix to R. SHEA & R. WiLsoN, THE ILLUMINATUS! TRILOGY 735-37 (1975). This
included Washington's letter to his doctor thanking him profusely for the marijuana seed and pamphlets on how to use them, repeated admonitions to his gardener not to waste any of the valuable
seed, and his diary entry of August 7, 1765, about separating "the male from the female hemp,"
something that would not usually have been done for rope manufacture, but probably for getting
high. As President, Washington appears not only to have continued smoking, but possibly to have
engaged in some dealing as well. In the spring of 1796, he wrote to his gardener, "What was done
with the seed saved from the India hemp last summer? It ought, all of it, to have been sewn [sic]
again; that not only a stock of seed sufficient for my own purposes might have been raised, but to
have disseminated the seed to others; as it is more valuable than the common hemp". Id. at 736.
96. For a summary of health effects of marijuana documenting its favorable comparison with
alcohol, see Hollister, Health Aspects of Cannabis,38 PHARMACOLOGICAL REV. 1 (1986). Hollister
notes that:
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tine in cigarettes, it is overused or abused by only a very small percentage
of users. 97 Even with them, the harms stemming from the abuse are probably quite mild compared with the corresponding harms from overuse of
alcohol.
Although your government and Partnership for a Drug-Free
America attempt to propagate scare stories and misinformation about
pot, review of the actual scientific literature confirms that forty years of
research have come up with nothing to implicate marijuana on a scale of
health or safety risks anywhere near those posed by tobacco and alcohol.
The Chief Administrative Law Judge of the Drug Enforcement Agency
(DEA), has recently called pot, "one of the safest therapeutically active
substances known to man,""8 and noted that whereas tobacco and alcohol are responsible, respectively, for 360,000 and 150,000 American
deaths annually, marijuana has not been unequivocally shown to be the
99
cause in even a single death.
Very few people know of this statistic, or of the Chief ALJ's comments. Politicians and media have tended to conceal the glaring injustice
of marijuana laws by placing pot in the same category with all illict recreational drugs, and speaking of the different substances as though they
were uniform. But even at this level there seems to be a kind of engineered hysteria being spread by misinformation. Though illegal drugs are
portrayed as causing "a plague of death and destruction," only about
3,500 die each year from all illicit drugs combined--compared with the
over 500,000 dying from tobacco and alcohol.l" °
So the question remains-why is pot illegal at all, let alone being
made the target of stepped-up enforcement? The reason most commonly
given by those in government is that marijuana is a "gateway drug." Trying it leads people, and especially the young, to move on to harder drugs,
The most definite health hazard [found in the study] was contamination of cannabis,
largely of Mexican origin, by the herbicide, paraquat... After the experience with paraquat in Mexico, its use was temporarily discontinued. Recently, the possibility that it
may be used against cannabis crops in California and Hawaii has resurfaced. One
would hope that overzealous law enforcement would not once again pose a serious
health risk to marijuana users.
Id. at 11.
97. Id.
98. McGuire, Injusticefor All: A Guide to U.S. Pot Laws, HIGH TiMEs, May, 1989, at 33 (quoting statements by Chief Administrative Law Judge Francis L. Young at a hearing in September
1988). See also In the Matter of Marijuana Rescheduling Petition, D.E.A. No. 86-22 (Sept. 6, 1988)
(quoting Chief A.L.J. Francis L. Young strongly recommending rescheduling of marijuana to allow
for accepted medical uses).
99. Id.; A. TREBACH, supra note 22, at 80-81.
100. Id.
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therefore it is best to stop everyone before they start. The extent of this
"gateway" phenomenon is open to doubt because after twenty years of
widespread pot smoking in our society, the number of pot smokers remains vastly higher than the number who use hard drugs. Also, the only
craving that pot induces is not for heroin, cocaine or anything else illegal-but for sugar.
So why should pot serve as a gateway drug? The most likely explanation is that it is provided by the same distributors as other, more dangerous drugs. Hence those who smoke it are put in contact with
opportunities to use other drugs. In other words, the gateway phenomenon comes not from marijuana itself, but from marijuana prohibition.
When the Netherlands legalized pot and allowed it to be sold openly
about fifteen years ago they found only a small increase in marijuana use,
01
but a very large drop in rates of heroin addiction among the young.
Conversely, in the United States, stepped-up enforcement of marijuana
laws gave organized crime a monopoly on distribution and allowed them
to temporarily withhold pot from the market in order to push the newly
synthesized form of cocaine called "crack."' ' Since then crack has remained a drug of choice in inner cities because it is more profitable, more
concentrated and less detectable than pot.
If marijuana is an essentially safe drug and the "gateway argument"
seems most persuasive as an argument against prohibition, why does pot
remain illegal? If we go back to 1937 when it was first made illegal, we
find that racial prejudice has a great deal to do with the current state of
our laws. In 1933, alcohol prohibition had just been lifted, but a federal
enforcement bureaucracy was still in place and some of its members had
begun searching for an alternative form of prohibition that was more
politically sustainable. The primary users of marijuana at this time were
the politically disenfranchised Mexican-Americans, so pot became an
easy target in Congress. A propaganda campaign was initiated which
took the racial stereotype of Mexican-Americans as hot-blooded, irrational and violent, and transferred it onto pot smokers as a group. Hence,
the infamous government-sponsored movie, "Reefer Madness." When
marijuana caught on in black inner-city ghettos a few years later, pot
smokers acquired a new racial stereotype-that of the lazy, shiftless
black person; a stereotype that is now dignified with the term "amotivational syndrome." Reputable scientific studies performed by the City of
New York disproved both of these stereotypes, but they were largely ig101.
102.

See Kupfer, hat to do About Drugs, FORTUNE, June 20, 1988, at 39.
See Cowan, supra note 22, at 2.
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nored in favor of scare stories and stereotyping. 10 3
While displaced racial prejudice can account for the emergence of
marijuana prohibition, it does little to justify its continuation. Similarly,
the fact that pot may serve as a focus for lingering prejudice against the
counterculture and 1960's radicalism can help to explain why the government continues to target it, but again no real justification is provided.
I thought I was going to hear a justification last summer when I
presented a paper entitled, "The War on Drugs as Social Psychosis" at a
scholars' conference last summer. The commenter was to be someone
who had introduced himself to me as former head of narcotics enforcement for a major state, and as someone who had been invited to be deputy director of the federal DEA. But when it came time for him to
comment, he expressed complete agreement with my paper and even privately chided me for understating the irrationality of government policies
regarding drugs like heroin and crack. With both pot and harder drugs,
current policies were "expressive rather than instrumental;" meaning,
they provided opportunities for people to vent their hatreds and
prejudices, but were not aimed at rationally achieving any defensible social objective.
I next thought of speaking with career DEA officials who were still
with the agency. I was fortunate in having the head of the Western New
York DEA come to my seminar. He at last cleared up the mystery, but
he did so in a manner that most of us should find constitutionally

troublesome. 104
"I make no bones about it," he began, "I'm a Puritan." He then
proceeded to explain that marijuana's lack of addictiveness or serious
health risks were not salient as far as his agency was concerned because
people use marijuana for only one purpose-"to get stoned." This, he
103. For informed discussion of the role of displaced racism and public deception in the setting
up of marijuana prohibition, see J. HIMMELSTEIN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF MARIJUANA: POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY OF DRUG CONTROL IN AMERICA 60-63, 125-30 (1983); D. MUSTO, THE
AMERICAN DISEASE: ORIGINS OF NARCOTICS CONTROL 244-45 (1973); J. HERRER, THE EMPORER

WEARS NO CLOTHES (1985). The N.Y. study, conducted under the auspices of Mayor LaGuardia, is
reported in THE MARIJUANA PAPERS (D. Solomon ed. 1966).
104. I have never been a strict absolutist on questions of separation of church and state. The
public display of a Creche, for example, has always struck me as reasonably harmless. But if the
government seeks to propagate certain types of religious views-for example, collective pursuit of
national redemption through creation of "a drug-free America"-while using threats of substantial
criminal penalties to suppress others' religious attitudes and practices and the lifestyle activities associated with them, then I suspect that the First Amendment's ban on religious establishment is being
rendered a dead letter regardless of the euphimisms employed, or the absence of visible protest from
large numbers of First Amendment scholars.
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explained, was "an offense against society no different in principle than
armed robbery." The reason it was an offense was (according to his religion) that each of us is born with a perfect mind which we can only defile
or despoil by ingesting mind-altering or mood-altering substances.
Although this view has no basis in any sort of scientific reality, it is, as he
pointed out, a central tenet of Puritanism.
At first, the regional director attempted to draw a distinction between alcohol, which could be consumed in minute quantities without
debasing oneself, and "drugs" of which even the most miniscule sampling was a serious offense. After being questioned by students, he abandoned the distinction and began saying that alcohol and cigarettes were
basically the same as drugs, except that it was not politically feasible to
outlaw them. A little while later he added coffee to the list, which provoked an outburst from me since coffee is my second favorite drug and I
had never anticipated that anyone from the government would tell me I
shouldn't use it. I blurted out, "But I use coffee to work!" He earnestly
replied: "I feel sorry for you."
Later in the seminar, I attempted to explain the Establishment and
Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. The regional director of
the DEA was not impressed. He said he understood what I was saying,
but this didn't matter if law enforcement was what a majority of the
American people wanted. I then asked, "So you're saying we should go
out and get a majority of the American people?"
"Absolutely," he replied, "it's the only thing you can do." Failing
that, we were destined to live under the yoke of his Puritanism.
Personally, I am not a Puritan, or even a Christian for that matter.
When I was growing up, my parents told me that there was no way I
could be forced to become a Christian, or adopt any religion not of my
own choosing. The United States government, they believed, would not
allow that sort of thing to happen because our Constitution strictly prohibits it. My parents did not foresee that religious persecution could be
infficted sub rosa by judges and legislators invoking the word "drugs" as
a code word for "devil" and "user" as a term meaning "infidel." They
assumed that the First Amendment would be as strong in actuality as it
was in theory.
Ideally, I would prefer that the Establishment Clause be taken seriously and that we not be forced to embrace tenets of any state-approved
religion. But I am a reasonable person who understands the importance
of compromise when faced with duress. Therefore, I propose the following: in lieu of forcing us to embrace a harsh Puritanism under threat of
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forfeiture of all we own, at least let us choose among the forms of Christianity, in return for our embracing one willingly.
Should we not at least be allowed to adopt a more loving and gentle
version of the Christian faith-since Christ, whatever else he was, was a
loving and gentle person? Then accord us the option of protection from
government marauding in return for our agreement to carry crucifixes at
all times. That way whenever a DEA or other police agent shows up he
can be driven backward by the power of the crucifix held up in his face.
If no crucifix is available, perhaps we can give the agent a finger-a
lone index finger, raised to say, "Approach no further, we are protected
by the power of the mighty First Amendment." Even when invisible to
judges and courts this doctrinal fount of liberty is a force deep in people's
hearts. And it is offended by the marijuana laws in every respect.
Though the disguised religious establishment problems of marijuana
prohibition are surely grave, it should not be thought that they are the
only infirmity. Problems of "free exercise of religion" and "freedom of
expression" are present as well. Because pot often produces a trance-like
state that is frequently accompanied by inspiration, and does not usually
cause the same lethargy of cognitive processes experienced with alcohol,
many people use it for private contemplative activities. For some people
this is part of a creative process aimed at producing works of art, literature or music-each the kind of self-expressive activity traditionally
thought to be at the core of the First Amendment. For others, the contemplation has a religious cast. The solitary drug experience provides
enhanced opportunities for communication with inner voices of the sort
involved in religious revelation.
Finally, there is "freedom of association." Many friendships are enhanced by the common activity of getting stoned together. Humor, discussion and feelings of identification with one another are sometimes
stimulated; sensory experiences are enhanced. Even marital relationships
are often benefitted by the use of pot. 105
Each of these activities ought to be receiving First Amendment protection if there is no compelling governmental interest to justify infringement. But what is the interest- other than in seeking to establish neoPuritanism as a national religion, or in kowtowing to the phobias of people uninformed about pot?
But, alas, other than the brave and lonely Supreme Court of the
105. See Herrer, supra note 103 at 60 (reports that "by the 1890's the most popular American
marriage guides recommended cannabis as an aphrodisiac of extraordinary powers.").
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State of Alaska," °6 no courts have used the First Amendment in this
area. Surely, this is a blind spot of astounding proportions. Even in circumstances most favorable to the assertion of "free exercise" claims,
courts' prejudice against pot has caused them to deny protection. In one
recent case before the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Rastafarians, who have used pot in their religious
ceremonies for centuries, were denied an exemption that would have enabled them to do so legally."0 7 The holding, sustained by two fine liberal
judges,' is difficult to square with prior decisions granting exemptions
for the use of more dangerous drugs in religious services, these being
peyote by the Native American Church, 0 9 and alcohol by the Roman
Catholic Church during prohibition. Though the reputations and liberal
credentials of the judges in question suggest that racism could not possibly have played a part in the decision, it is difficult to imagine how the
majority could have reached its result in light of the minimal risks of
smoking pot without their having tacitly assumed that the black Jamaicans in question lacked souls, and thus were not entitled to religious freedom in any ordinary sense.
But perhaps we are wrong even to search for a rationale for this
decision. The problem may be that a type of institutionalized insanity has
rendered courts and other government agencies incapable of knowing the
difference between reason and prejudice whenever issues pertaining to
marijuana are raised. As a result of this breakdown, many judges may
now have a diminished capacity to control deep-seated aggressive impulses that propel them toward barbarism and religious persecution.
To test this hypothesis, we should present a factually analogous situation in a context free of prejudice. Imagine a traditional form of religious practice that uses implements posing the same degree of health risk
as marijuana-the community of worshippers become ecstatic and contemplative by wearing silver necklaces with conch shells. Then imagine
two different responses from our legal system: in one instance tolerance is
106. Ravin v. State, 537 P. 2d 494 (1975).
107. Olsen v. DEA, 878 F. 2d 1458 (1989). In this case, the Court acknowledged that the Coptic
Zionist Church's use of marijuana was an authentic religious practice, but declined to accord protection because of "the immensity" of the nation's marijuana control problem. It thereby created a
novel legal principle that freedom of religious practice, as distinguished from belief, can be revoked
by the government if the nature of the practice is something that large numbers of people find desirable outside of its specifically religious context.
108. Initially, the conservative judge on the panel, James Buckley, dissented based on his being
"troubled" by the holding's discriminatory aspects. However, by the time of publication, his brief
dissent had been eliminated.
109. See, e.g., Peyote Way Church of God v. Smith, 742 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1984).
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accorded, in the other worshippers are subjected to heavy fines, property
confiscation and other forms of persecution for possessing or wearing a
silver necklace with conch shells.
What would one say about a legal system that followed the latter
course while being firmly committed in principle to the idea of free exercise of religion? No doubt its officials would have some series of rationalizations about the necklaces being basically tools of the devil and a
gateway to ever greater sin, but we would, I hope, judge them harshly.
Religious persecution is always based on the belief that those persecuted
are not exercising a "true religion," but instead, some sort of shameful
hedonism and deviance. Nevertheless, for our courts to be indulging in
this sort of nonsense at this point in our history-is this not a clear instance of breakdown and of triumph of prejudice over reason? Even if
marijuana had no religious use at all, I believe we pot smokers would be
entitled to protection under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause. That clause at least ostensibly protects cultural minorities
from being unfairly stigmatized and affirmatively persecuted by the government. But look at what has happened during the last decade: tax dollars have been used to sponsor vicious campaigns of prejudice against
marijuana users, portraying them as lazy, disgusting and frivolous-in
short, the types of people who deserve to have their property confiscated.
Despite the ludicrous quality of the commercials, they appear to be having some effect through sheer saturation of the airwaves. Due to Congress' repeal of the fairness doctrine and massive funding of antimarijuana campaigns, the Partnership for a Drug-free America is able to
put on one misleading commercial after another. These commercials,
which seldom have the least iota of truth value, either promote scare
stories about fictitious medical effects or nakedly seek to instill prejudice
by portraying pot smokers as lazy, contemptible and stupid. But like the
equally ridiculous commercials that were used by Nazis to instill prejudice against their targets, these commercials have had some effect.
Whereas in 1977, only 41 percent of people polled expressed the view
that possession of small amounts of marijuana should be a criminal offense and 53 percent disagreed, a decade later 67 percent had come to
feel it should be criminal and only 27 percent felt it should not."'
110.
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Typical of the types of propaganda activities that have secured this result are the following: In
one commercial a surgeon, who is smoking a joint, giggles as the patient protests to him that he is
about to perform the wrong operation. In another, pot-smoking teenagers talk about loafing for the
rest of their lives. In a third a father badgers his son for possessing marijuana and shouts, "Who
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Given the combination of governmental cultivation of prejudice and
extreme, oppressive laws on the books, it would appear that a dangerous
situation is developing-the very type of situation where an honest and
even-handed applicationf of First Amendment principle is most urgently
needed. So far though, neither courts nor others in government have
been willing to step forward.
All this raises serious questions about the proper role of law professors when the country's government and legal system are malfunctioning
in ways that contravene our most basic constitutional principles. In general, I can think of three cardinal rules of duty that should guide us in
preparing the next generation of lawyers. First, we should ideally seek to
be unfailingly intelligent; second, we should under no circumstances allow ourselves to become wilfully ignorant; and third, we should take seriously our duty to uphold the United States Constitution. In doing so we
must concern ourselves with the Constitution's spirit as well as its letter,
and we must be ever vigilant about the risks of demogoguery and tyranny
posed by majoritarian rule.
If these three rules are followed, then it should be clear that each of
us has an obligation not to let the scapegoating and oppression of pot
smokers proceed any further. If personal liberty means anything beyond
the contorted definitions offered by biased judges and demagogic politicians, it means that people should have the right to smoke pot. If our
constitution is to retain more integrity than that of a bicycle thief, surely
you will set yourself to work on giving us the protection to which we are
rightfully entitled.
One of the proudest moments in the generally dismal experience of
the Second World War occurred shortly after the Nazis had occupied
Denmark and issued orders requiring all Jews to wear the Star of David.
The next day the King of Denmark rode through the streets, himself
wearing the Star of David. Largely as a result of this demonstration, and
the protective behavior it inspired, the persecution of Danish Jewry
turned out to be miniscule compared with what occurred in other
countries.
Now, as a result of the breakdown of intelligence in our governing
institutions, you have an opportunity to be that King of Denmark, and to
place your own prestige and security on the line against those who would
taught you to do this stuff?" He looks devastated when the son bursts out, "You did! Okay? You
did." A fourth one purports to compare the brainwaves of a "normal" teenager with a teenager on
marijuana, although the latter's flat waves were later discovered to really have been from a person in
a deep coma.
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transmute our legal system into an abomination and render basic First
Amendment principles nugatory. Are there not some appropriate rituals
of noncompliance that can be practiced-the potluck dinner with exotic
herb; the culturally deviant party with students in private homes; the
open and frank discussion in class; even the signing of statements that we
will not cooperate in the enforcement of these absurd laws against any of
our students? Is it hot worth making at least some effort to foster the
integrity of our legal system rather than have to live, perhaps for decades, with an overriding sense of shame and hypocrisy rooted in the
knowledge that a little courageous behavior, carefully deployed at the
right time, could have made an enormous difference?
Should not law schools, acting as a kind of fifth estate, attempt to
remedy the breach in our constitutional fabric that is being caused by the
opportunism and ignorance of those in government and media? Wellpositioned elites who have the capacity to make a difference have the
obligation to do so once the arbitrary and unjust nature of governmental
action has become apparent. Just as the Nazis depended on slaves to load
poison gas cannisters onto trains, so do the would-be architects of an
American police state depend on us for the production of prosecutors
and agents. They also depend on us to look the other way and pretend
that our Constitution is still intact when in practice it is being grossly
eviscerated.
So how about it, Ronald Dworkin,1 11 are we taking rights seriously?
Or are we not?" 2 What do you say, Owen Fiss, about really trying to
establish a public morality?" 3 If you like the idea, how about beginning
with our long-held constitutional values of personal liberty, enlightened
tolerance, and separation of church and state? Larry Tribe-should deceitful manipulation and prejudice mongering by the state and corporate
media be allowed to govern us in perpetuity? Or might the people acting
locally, and in solidarity with one another, have some role?' 14 And you,
John Hart Ely, what do you say about trying to improve our democratic
111. Neither simple possession nor consumption of marijuana is a criminal offense within the
territorial boundaries of New York State, the situs of this article. Insofar as any of the particular
liberal scholars addressed below reside in states which have not decriminalized pot, the theoretical
possibility of an interstate conspiracy to commit a misdemeanor (which is itself a felony) is posed.
However, the author has not contacted anyone to arrange for or encourage performance of the
activities in question at any specific time and place. The exhortation remains theoretical rather than
imminent and for this reason is protected by the First Amendment. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444 (1969).
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processes?1 15 There is a problem with how they are now being practiced
in the corridors of Washington and the boardrooms of New York. Might
it not be time for some helpful input from the fifth estate?
If all this falls on deaf ears and listless eyes, there is still an important lesson to remember: the failure of liberalism to come through in this
instance where it is being seriously tested is not a failure of liberalism as a
series of philosophical premises. It is a failure of courage on the part of
particular people who are either not very serious about the constitutional
ideas they profess or not very generous in their willingness to take even
the slightest of personal risks in order to help large numbers of other
people. If so, then surely disgust is warranted. But the disgust should be
aimed at such liberals, not at the liberalism they betray. The mistakes of
CLS-indeterminacy theory should not be repeated, even if the spinelessness that gave rise to them is.
Very sincerely,
The Author
Now, whatever the reader may think of this exhortation and its author, at least the response is not likely to be the bland, "So what?" that
frequently accompanies demonstrations of the indeterminacy of legal
doctrine. The exhortation, for better or for worse, does have a kind of
moral force that stems from its orientation of Taking Liberalism Seriously and using the concept of Rule of Law critically. The force of the
argument can be gauged by the diverse reactions of readers-most will
probably be either outraged or painfully frustrated, if not at the government, then at least at the author. It is difficult to imagine any set of
comparable feelings coming from any specific political argument based
on CLS-indeterminacy theory. After all, what is to be said? Throw away
your contracts book because either outcome can be reached in any case?
Judges lie when they pretend that doctrine necessitated a certain decision? So what, should we lock them up?
The attack on marijuana laws has greater moral force because it is
written from the perspective of one conceivably aggrieved by a specific
injury in fact, it focuses on both law and facts to frame political issues,
and on governmental action that is arbitrary in the sense of contravening
basic principles. This, much more than the highly abstract meanderings
115. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
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of indeterminacy theory, is the stuff of which political movements are
made.
III.

PART

Two: CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES AS A CONTRIBUTION
TO JURISPRUDENCE

The first half of this article has argued that attempts to build a political movement around the goal of proselytizing Critical Legal Studiesindeterminacy theory make little sense. The major contribution of CLS is
not to the building of any sort of radical movement, but to the evolution
of jurisprudential thought. This contribution can be more precisely delineated if radical pretensions are abandoned, and CLS is seen as a force for
redefining the nature of legal principles in ways that allow them to be
designated without reliance on outmoded formalist conceptions.
Some CLS writers attempt to straddle the issue of political movement versus jurisprudential contribution by calling Critical Legal Studies
"a jurisprudential movement." 1 x6 This allows the "movement's" practitioners to continue making unfounded political claims about the ostensibly superior radicalism of their enterprise compared with liberalism,
without asking the question of whether CLS-indeterminacy theory really
has the political force they attribute to it. But their jurisprudential contribution can be better made if pretensions of movementhood are abandoned, and CLS scholarship is seen as part of an ongoing dialogue with
others in the profession.
By setting aside their antipathy to the very ideas of legal principle
and Rule of Law, CLS writers will become better able to express and
develop the implications of one of their most important discoveriesnamely, that instead of looking for a single type of morally-grounded,
outcome-determinative legal principle, we are really looking for two different things. One, which I will call "doctrinal ordering principles" or
"legal principles," is outcome-determinative and accounts for the stability of patterns of legal doctrine. Because law is neither static nor capable
of achieving complete internal consistency, legal principles are only partially outcome-determinative. They specify ranges of expected or plausible results, and provide grounds for saying decisions outside these ranges
are anomalous or legally incorrect. They do not eliminate the category of
close cases that could be decided either way; they merely limit its size
and distinguish it from other types of cases where legal correctness seems
ascertainable and outcomes are readily predictable.
116.

Minda, supra note 11.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

When one gets down to actually mapping patterns of case outcomes,
one is likely to discover that patterns do not closely comport with any
abstract ideal or fundamental moral principle. Legal principles that account for ordered patterns of doctrine are better seen as strategies of
maintaining social stability by calibrating redistributions of political and
economic power, and reinforcing the forms of ideology through which
power is exercised and popular consent is obtained. Though such strategies can be validated by certain kinds of normative argument, they are
not themselves the fount of moral legitimacy upon which the law
depends.
The underlying sources of law's moral legitimacy may be described
as "moral" or "ethical" principles that are embedded in the country's
shared political culture and have a reach and range of applications that
are shaped by common custom, practice and expectations. The Rule of
Law requires that both moral and legal principles be present and incorporated into legal doctrine to some degree. Legal institutions strive to
maintain a reasonable degree of alignment between law's underlying popular moral basis and its positive doctrine; they do this largely by relying
on outcome-determinative legal principles that are best described as legitimation strategies. Legal principles must be incorporated sufficiently to
make the pursuit of doctrinal regularity a reasonably cogent and intelligent activity. Popular moral principles must be adhered to sufficiently to
generate the social stability that allows the legal principles to remain in
force.
The Rule of Law exists in varying stages of perfection or breakdown. When relatively successful, it inspires seemingly voluntary popular consent, social stability and a masking of state coercive power. When
unsuccessful it yields widespread noncompliance based on shared feelings
of law's absurdity, immorality or inappropriateness; with this comes
either a reduction of government's capacity to control behavior or a
heightening of state terror.
The Rule of Law concept can be invoked critically as an ideal, and
used as a reference point to criticize particular instances of lawmaking
that fail to sustain the necessary degree of connection with underlying
moral principles that furnish the basis of law's legitimacy. Such laws are
likely to inspire widespread noncompliance and rebellion, and thus a
breakdown in the Rule of Law. Or they may present a latent possibility
of breakdown because popular support is being maintained through manipulation or demagogy; so that if the truth were known (as it might soon
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come to be), the law as propounded by courts and other agencies would
be seen as greatly out of alignment with its popular moral basis.
The relation between law and politics should likewise be clarified to
avoid the dichotomy that law is either separate and apart from politics,
or it is the same thing as politics. If politics is defined as the totality of
human behavior involved in ordering society, then law can be viewed as
the subset of politics marked by having aspirations toward doctrinal regularity on the one hand, and alignment with popular morality on the
other. We thus would no longer ask whether something is "law" or
"politics," but would distinguish among political behavior that is purely
ad hoc or unconcerned with moral legitimacy on the one hand, and behavior that seeks to articulate established law, or behavior aimed at
changing or establishing some new form of law on the other.
With these clarifications in mind, we can turn to the argument that
CLS-indeterminacy theory does not negate all conceptions of legal or
doctrinal ordering principle, but rather undercuts conceptions that are
formalist in nature while favoring those that have a realist or functionalist character.
A. Realist and Formalist Conceptions of Legal Principle
Legal principles must have three attributes regardless of how they
are conceived. These are: feasibility, at least partial outcome-determinativeness and normative validation. The attribute of feasibility is simply
that the principle must be capable of being enforced. Because society
evolves historically, ideas not feasible in one historical period may become so in another. To formulate legal principles requires at least an
implicit awareness of what is feasible at the time, and a conceptual way
of guiding one's formulation to stay within this range. Realism and formalism both accomplish this, but do so in different ways.
Satisfying the requirement of feasibility may be implicit in meeting
the second requirement of outcome-determinativeness. By showing that a
legal principle accounts for patterns of case outcomes, one demonstrates
that the principle has been enacted into law. Assuming that the law has
been followed, the principle is shown to have been feasible, and barring
substantial change to the contrary, may be presumed to be feasible still.
Being codified into law is the sine qua non of a legal, as opposed to
moral, principle, and being outcome-determinative is necessary for legal
principle to perform its essential function of making argument from precedent a meaningful exercise. The whole enterprise of arguing from precedent makes sense only if one presumes the existence of normatively
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valid principles which ought to be followed, and which account for the
patterns of outcomes; so that by following precedents, courts implicitly
are guided by a morally defensible principle. Since the primary task of
legal principles, as distinct from moral or philosophical ones, is to sustain
the meaningfulness of legal argument, it does not suffice merely to have
attractive moral precepts. The precepts must account for the pattern of
case outcomes; they must be outcome-determinative. Although they need
not specify an outcome in every case, they must narrow the range of
plausibly correct outcomes, and then provide a way of structuring debate
over alternatives within the plausible range. When principles have such a
prescriptive, outcome-determinative character, this enables their proponents to show linkages between principles and prior case outcomes;
thereby supporting their claim that the principles are grounded in existing law and ought to be followed because they are the law.
The third requirement is that the principles must be amenable to
some persuasive form of normative validation. Realism and formalism
offer different ways of validating principles, the credibility of each being
rooted in the philosophy's background assumptions about the nature of
the social world.
The essential difference between realism and formalism can be approached by asking the question-how does one view an ice cube in a
freezer? One who thought in the language of formalist discourse would
concentrate on the exterior surface appearance of the ice cube, note its
solid form, and identify it with the ideal form of "ice cube." The formalist would also assume that its continuation as a solid structure is the
natural state of affairs, and thus assert that so long as the cube is "undisturbed," it will continue its existence as direct embodiment of a universal
ideal. The formalist disavows interest in comprehending either the ice
cube's interior crystalline structure or the impacts of its surrounding environment on it, both of which sustain the cube's solidity and seeming
permanence.
The realist, by contrast, sees the solidity as only a momentary appearance; the fixed identification with a universal form of "ice cube" as
illusory, and focuses instead on the motion and potential for change
within the cube, as well as on the surrounding freezer's input of energy
which sustains the solid form. The ice cube is seen as a conglomeration of
rapidly moving molecules which, if their motion is accelerated, will melt
or partially melt the crystalline structure of the cube, thereby allowing
the cube to be reformed. Awareness of the prospect of reform and of the
multiplicity of potential ice-cube shapes vitiates any close identification
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of the particular cube with the ideal form of 'ice cube.' Hence, deducing
the one from the other is a futile and fallacious exercise.
Translating the ice-cube metaphor back into a discussion of law, the
realist and formalist differ fundamentally in their interpretation of popular consent to existing social arrangements. The formalist sees it as an
irreducible fact akin to the ice cube's solidity. Consent is deemed to be
authentic and rational because the existing arrangements are seen as embodying liberal ideals embraced by the populace generally. Thus, consent
is a natural state of affairs that will remain so long as the social order is
undisturbed by alien influences.
The realist views popular consent and perceptions of the social order's legitimacy as only a surface appearance that could change. He or
she assumes that voluntary submission to the will of dominant forces is
brought about by an underlying (or latent) coercion; the existence of
which generates a need for consciousness that prevents destructive conflict by inspiring ready compliance. The realist assumes that consent and
stability exist only in relation to the latent coercion, just as the ice cube
exists only in relation to the freezer.
Just as the realist focuses on the motion and potential for change
within the ice cube, so does he look upon society as a whole. He is thus
precluded from viewing society as a stable, unitary entity, as the formalist does, but rather sees it as a conglomeration of contending forces, akin
to groups of moving molecules. To identify the relevant groups and understand their interaction is of critical importance for the realist, but of
little or no interest to the formalist. The latter seeks to portray existing
social arrangements as static and universal, and for this portrayal, descriptions of latent conflict and coercion are not useful.
Thus, the realist views law as intrinsically political in the sense of
being a result and residue of omnipresent political conflict. The formalist
sees law as having been elevated above politics by the unified society's
consensual commitment to principles that shape the legal order. Formalist discourse, which is the form of discourse most frequently encountered
in judical opinions, describes this commitment in terms that connote
universality and immutability. Thus, we read of the fundamental rights
of (abstract, universal) individuals, and of the needs and interests of social order-meaning not simply this social order during a given historical
period, or in the midst of an ongoing strategy of governance, but of every
social order, or at least of the type of social order to which we collectively are indefatigably committed. To the realist, the terms "fundamental rights" and "societal needs" lack any fixed meaning, but rather are
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used as symbolic expressions of the imperatives of historically specific
strategies of governance. For example, individuals' current right of free
speech, viewed by a realist, is seen to have become law during the New
Deal, and to have been instrumental for perpetuating the New Deal coalition and thereby facilitating the changes in governance which it has
brought. Because the realist wishes to translate legal doctrine into the
language of practical politics, he is apt to be more interested than the
formalist in understanding law as reification. "Reification" refers to the
process by which individual and collective choices, to accept prevailing
social arrangements come to be seen as law, which has an existence and7
integrity that are independent of the political choices that produced it.t1
By overlooking or denying reification, one comes to believe that law is
above politics in the sense of not being shaped by political choice. Acknowledging reification leads one to view legal doctrine as either an accretion of inconsistent political choices, or as a manifestation of
sustained, underlying choices that are implemented by patterns of case
outcomes.
Because reification is a psychological process of justifying and facilitating submission to the dominant coercive forces, focusing on it leads
one to consider how ways in which latent threats of coercion generate
seemingly voluntary consent. Thus, the concept of reification serves as a
gateway to realist insights. Only by obscuring reification may one continue to speak of law as having an existence, integrity and logic all its
own, that can be understood without reference to politics or social conflict. Formalist approaches to constructing legal principles generally have
the following common characteristics. They deny, either explicitly or implicitly, that legal principles are comprised of political choice; explicit
denials take the form of claims that legal principles are "neutral," or
"consensual" or "above politics;" '18 implicit denials consist of treating
the political-choice aspect of principles as a forbidden topic and deeming
any discussion of it superfluous for understanding or validating legal
principles.
Because legal doctrine generally is comprised of formalist discourse,
formalists are apt to be willing to take doctrine on its own terms. They
tend to view it as a free-standing, self-sufficient conceptual structure that
exudes its own moral justification, is glued together by its own inner logic
117.
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(as distinct from political choice or strategy) and thus contains legal principles within it. A non-formalist version of legal doctrine sees it as held
together by the strategic requirements of a political program that needs
to be openly expressed in order to articulate legal principles coherently.
For the realist, all attempts to portray specific legal outcomes as
mandated by a neutral logic above politics are illusory because legal reasoning can have no sustained direction or coherence other than that provided by an underlying political commitment. Because all lawmaking
and adjudication are intrinsically political, the process of deriving legal
outcomes through reasoning grounded in legal doctrine is simply a reified
way of reproducing the underlying political choices. For the realist, lawmaking and adjudication are oriented toward the realization of shared
ideals of human association only secondarily. Their first commitment is
legitimizing and stabilizing existing patterns of social relations which include pervasive inequalities of power and privilege, that are sustained by
legal principles.
As has been explained, realist insights about law are linked by a
common underlying vision of social order. Society is viewed as rife with
latent conflicts capable of evolving toward divergent patterns of association, and held to existing patterns by underlying coercion. Thus, in formulating legal principles, one is obliged to identify antagonistic groups in
order to understand the latent conflicts. By contrast, the vision that underlies formalist discourse portrays society as a unitary whole governed
by a purely voluntary consent. The unity is expressed by doctrine that
ascribes legal rules either to the needs of society as a whole or to the
rights of an abstract, universal individual. This obviates the need to identify antagonistic groups, and sustains the illusion that law is above,
rather than subsumed within, political conflict.
Both the formalist and realist visions depict lawmaking as legitimation, but differ in whether it should be seen as a static or dynamic process. The formalist sees existing law as directly embodying immutable
ideals of liberty and rationality. Hence, existing social relations are portrayed as the culmination of historical development, and they are imbued
with a legitimacy that exists irrespective of whether social movements
seek to challenge them. By contrast, legitimation for the realist is a process of adaptation to constellations of power and custom which themselves can change. Because the realist views the prevailing popular
consent to existing relations as based upon underlying coercion, insurgencies seeking to reform these relations may be justified, as may be the
legal system's attempts to coopt and legitimize the movements by incor-
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porating their demands into law. Thus, there is an affinity between realism and reformism on the one hand, and between formalism and
conservatism on the other. If one assumes that the only possible conceptions of legal principle are formalist ones, then embracing realism will
lead us to view law as unprincipled. For this reason, realists often impugn the enterprise of legal reasoning as having no serious intellectual or
moral integrity. 1 9 They assert that legalistic argument is unprincipled,
first because it is simply a mask or mystification of underlying political
choice arrived at for reasons other than those expressed in legal doctrine;
second, because any close scrutiny of doctrine will show it to be incoherent, incapable of rationally determining legal outcomes, and thus unable
to support any analytically defensible conception of principle; and third,
because patterns of legal outcomes comes insofar as they reflect intelligible ordering at all, do not approximate full realization of any widely
shared value or ideal. Rather, they promote the morally dubious enterprise of perpetuating and legitimating existing patterns of power and
privilege, and strive to achieve values or ideals only insofar as they are
consonant with that enterprise. Thus, in the typical realist view, at least
two requirements of legal principle-normative validation, and an analytical scheme capable of determining case outcomes-are unattainable.
To formulate realist principles, we must change the rules of the
game so as to allow that the political choices to which many officials
conform might thereby become legal principles. If fundamental political
choices are not made spontaneously or instantaneously, but entail collective commitments to political ordering strategies having durations of decades or longer, then encompassed within a political choice maybe a
stable, analytical scheme that implements the choice.
Wishing to remain conscious of reification, and to explain how legal
doctrine signifies strategies of governance, the realist is apt to describe
principles as having two parts, a conceptual overlay, composed of logically interconnected doctrine the application of which prescribes cases
outcomes in accordance with the principle, and a practicalunder-layer,
which explains in realistic, social science terms how and why law-makers
have made the political choice to constitute this particular principle and
to codify expressions of it in decisions, orders and statutes. The overlay
and the underlayer will be contradictory in the following sense: the former will speak of conceptual necessity and of correct results arrived at
objectively through the application of a principle which is universal; in119. See, e.g., R. UNGER, supra note 19.
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deed, the overlay is comprised of the mental processes of operating
within the universe of a principle, while the underlayer contains a frank
admission that the entire principle itself is the product of political choice
made on behalf of social arrangements and interests which are particular.
This contradiction does not invalidate the principle either as scientific construct or as moral endeavor, but only the attempt to present the
conceptual overlay as the principle in toto and to claim that the existence
of the overlay constitutes law as something entirely separate from politics. Because lawmaking and the forming of legal principles are reified
activities in which political choices come to be reconceptualized as external, objective necessities, realistic descriptions of legal principles seek to
capture the process of reification by revealing the principles in both their
incarnations. This necessitates maintaining the full format of overlay and
underlayer, and thus requires us to tolerate the contradiction.
Realist and formalist conceptions of principle seek different ways to
satisfy the three requirements of feasibility, outcome-determinativeness
and normative validation. Both may attempt to show feasibility and outcome-determinativeness by positing some conceptual structure of legal
doctrine. Insofar as doctrine can be depicted as a coherent array where
case outcomes and patterns of rhetoric have some systematic relation to
one another, explicating the purposiveness that underlies the coherence
can yield principles with demonstrated feasibility and sufficient outcomedeterminative power. In seeking to divine this purposiveness, realists
look downward into the realm of political conflict and strategy; formalists look upward to the shared ideals of liberalism. By positing ideals as
the basis of legal principles, and sometimes explicitly equating principles
with ideals, formalists create the risk that their principles will not be
feasible. They attempt to overcome this problem by an intellectual strategy that Herbert Marcuse has described as one-dimensional thought.120
Ideals are merged conceptually with existing patterns of social relations.
Thus, "liberty" is equated with unregulated contractual, market transactions, the idea of "democracy" with existing political institutions, and
that of "majority rule" with particular acts of legislative majorities, and
so forth. Thus, one hears that our shared commitment to the ideal of
majoritarianism creates a strong argument against judicial decisions that
overrule Congress by proclaiming constitutional rights, and that the ideal
of a universal individual's liberty of expression prohibits government
120. See H. MARCUSE, ONE DIMENSIONAL MAN (1964).
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from attempting to regulate private contractual transactions involving
speech.
Realists, by contrast, conceive of legal principles as strategies of governance. Since principles cannot be presumed valid merely because they
are strategies, advocates of realist principles are obliged to seek normative validation in two stages-by first narrowing the range of feasible alternative strategies, and then arguing that a given legal principle
constitutes a strategy (or part of a strategy) that is preferable to the other
alternatives. Liberal ideals can furnish a reference point in choosing
among alternatives, but cannot be equated with the legal principles
themselves.
B.

The Anti-formalism of the CriticalLegal Studies Movement

The Critical Legal Studies movement has generated a powerful
three-stage critique of legal formalism and of formalist conceptions of
principle. Its first stage, which is commonly referred to as "demonstrating the incoherence of doctrine," gives us a strong reason to move away
from the predominance of formalist discourse in judicial opinions. The
critique does this by showing that the statements of liberal ideals and of
abstract societal needs that are called "principles" in judicial opinions
cannot be true legal principles because, their oppositional character,
combined with their failure to account for their own boundaries, deprives
them of outcome-determinativeness. Thus, if they were the operative
legal principles, doctrine would be incoherent, and thus unprincipled.
This sets up the second stage of the critique which challenges formalism's partialling out contrary aspects of liberal ideals (for example,
individual autonomy versus collective well-being) and using them as
would-be principles. According to this critique, the relevance of liberal
ideals to legal argument must be in their setting forth a unified, positive
vision of social relations which furnishes a reference point from which to
judge the desirability of particular outcomes in specific, concrete situations. Once liberal ideals are used in this way, as opposed to having their
polar aspects abstracted from the unified vision and made contradictory,
it becomes clear that established legal doctrine cannot plausibly be depicted as a consistent effort to apply liberal ideals.
The third stage of the critique uses historical awareness to undercut
formalism's attempt to construct legal principles out of universal needs of
an abstract social order. Generalized theories of "the needs of industrial
society," or "the imperatives of bureaucracy" fail to account for anything
as specific as patterns of legal outcomes because the same functions can
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be served by divergent principles and case results. 121 This critique of
large-scale functionalist determinism forces the formalist claim of necessity to be reconceptualized as a specific, historically contingent circumstance rather than a universal first principle of societies. By conceding
necessities to be historically specific and contingent, the formalist incurs
the burden of having to account for their emergence in a given setting
and period. Serious attempts to meet this burden are likely to lead down
a path toward greater understanding of societal conflict and realist insights, thereby undercutting formalist conceptions.
1. The "Incoherence of Doctrine" Critique: The Problem of Unbounded Complementarity of RationalizationFormats. If legal opinions
are read superficially, they appear to reveal a deductive process by which
courts reason from shared values, ideals and societal needs to arrive at
results in particular cases. Courts appear to fashion principles out of values, and, after checking to see that their applications are in line with
what other courts have done, they apply the principles. But if one looks
more deeply and contemplates not merely each opinion in isolation, but
the process of opinion-writing as a whole, then a different picture
emerges.
The statements of "principle" contained in opinions, which I will
call rationalization formats rather than "principles," tend to exist in opposing pairs. Unless their range of applicability is carefully bounded,
they create opportunities for infinite manipulability. A court wishing to
reach one result may characterize a fact situation one way and invoke the
appropriate rationalization format. If it wishes to reach the opposite result, then it characterizes the facts differently and invokes the opposing
format. If the principles guiding courts consist only of the two formats,
then the claim that principles determine case outcomes is belied by the
fact that neither format specifies the boundaries of its applicability, and
that by choosing between the two formats, a court can reach opposite
results.
For example, two familiar opposing formats are those of contractual
freedom (that courts should uphold and enforce privately agreed upon
bargains manifesting the free intentions of the parties) and of fraud or
duress (that courts should look behind the outer appearance of consent in
order to invalidate bargains arrived at through unfair trickery or one
side's exploitation of inordinate, unjustified inequality of bargaining
power). Applying the rationalization format of duress, virtually any
121.

See Gordon, CriticalLegal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984).
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court will refuse to enforce a parent's promise to pay a kidnapper money
in exchange for the safe return of his or her children. Likewise, most
courts will invoke the format of fraud to invalidate a consumer's obligation to a merchant who falsely represented that a given commodity was
worth $1,000 when in reality the consumer could have purchased the
same item from any number of other merchants for less than $200. However, when alien migrant agricultural workers (also known as "temporary workers") are paid less than the minimum wage to harvest crops
under impending threat of deportation, most courts are likely to invoke
the format of contractual freedom in order to enforce an agreement specifying the low wages. A worker who took more than the contractually set
amount would be guilty of theft.
Of course, these agreements could plausibly be deemed the product
of duress, given the relative bargaining positions which have enabled the
employers to negotiate such favorable contracts. Likewise, one could
even argue that the contracts were the product of fraud. By deceiving the
laborers into thinking that they were receiving a fair wage, and by concealing from them the knowledge that if they unionized they could get
more, the employers have tricked the laborers into signing contracts to
their detriment, just as the merchant who sells the overpriced item for
$1,000 has deceived the consumer by not revealing that he could
purchase the same item elsewhere for less than $200. Although this application of "duress" seems improbable, and the application of "fraud"
far-fetched, each is logically possible if our conception of legal principle
contains nothing beyond the formats themselves. We know that they are
improbable or far-fetched because of our implicit knowledge, often perceived as "common sense," which tells us when a format's logical application to facts is to be embraced or dismissed. Our intuitive conception of
legal principle contains an array of application codes as well as rationalization formats.
These codes tell us when arguable injustices are to be taken as given,
and when they will be deemed reprehensible and open to correction by
the law. The uneven bargaining power of employers and alien laborers,
including the threat of deportation, is taken as given, hence, the laborer's
resignation to it and their willingness to accept wages below minimum
wage are deemed the exercise of rational free will rather than the product
of fraud or duress. Logically, the same exercise of accepting injustice as
given could be performed on behalf of the kidnapper. One could reason
that although the normal rule is that parents do not have to pay to keep
their children, when they negligently release children under circum-
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stances where seizure is foreseeable, their inadequate supervision becomes the proximate cause of the seizure. The law will not provide free
return of the children because in general it provides no compensation for
one who is the victim of his own negligence. This being so, the loss of the
children is accepted as given, and the parents must then decide how to
get them back.
One vehicle might be to seek a declaration of custody from a court,
but another, and generally preferred one, is free contractual arrangements among consenting parties. Thus, courts should validate and uphold the consensual agreement between parent and kidnapper provided
neither party deceives the other about the nature of the bargain and
neither exploits its superior bargaining power to demand a price greatly
at variance from the going rate for safe return of a child.
Of course, this is ridiculous. Everyone knows that the proper format
to apply with a kidnapper is "the state shall intervene to prevent injustice
regardless of the parties' consent," rather than, "courts should let stand
the results of freely negotiated contracts." But again, the source of our
knowledge is the application code that bounds the two formats rather
than the formats themselves.
Can we not then define our outcome-determinative principle as simply the formats and codes in their totality? If such a conception seems
indigestibly massive, it can be brought to proper proportion by convenient treatise-like summaries. And putting aesthetics aside for the moment, we will have warded off the "incoherence of doctrine" critique by
showing its error in mistaking for "principle" the rationalization formats
which are merely parts of legal principles. Moreover, we will have postponed the onerous task of constructing a practical under-layer that
dwells in the messy world of political choice. Both the rationalization
formats and application codes are contained within legal doctrine itself,
and might plausibly be portrayed as parts of a unified, self-sufficient conceptual overlay. This would be true but for two things. First, legal doctrine does not adequately account for its application codes. It
concentrates on making the application of a format appear reasonable
once that format has been selected. Without articulating the rationality
implicit in the codes themselves, it is open to the charge of being arbitrary. And secondly, without revealing its essential purposes, it is not
amenable to cogent forms of normative validation. Arguments about
legal rules' moral validity should depend upon an assessment of their
purposes under the circumstances. If doctrine is taken at face value, realization of liberal ideals might appear to be its underlying purpose. But
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doctrine cannot be taken at face value because the purposive ordering of
application codes which gives doctrine its coherence is not explained in
the doctrine itself. Thus we must ask, "Why are the codes and formats
arrayed as they are?" Only when this question has been answered can we
begin to reach a judgment as to whether the principle that shapes the
array is morally defensible.
2. The Problem of Inauthenticity That Emerges When ExistingApplication Codes Are Viewed as Attempts to Actualize Liberal Values.
Without fixed application codes, legal doctrine would be a meaningless
morass of contrary premises. These codes, although rarely described systematically in legal doctrine, represent the heart of legal principles. Thus,
if principles are to be shown to have normative validity, the validation
must apply to the codes as well as to the rationalization formats they
summon. Although the formats have the intuitive appeal of being expressions of shared values, the codes do not.
Because the rationalization formats tend to exist in opposing pairs,
the codes which set boundaries cannot derive their justification from the
moral appeal of the formats. Any application which takes the opportunity to implement one desirable format (for example, contractual freedom) thereby foregoes the opportunity to implement another
(governmental protection from injustice). Even when an application code
can be expressed as the manifestation of a rationalization format, it still
faces the charge of having failed to manifest the opposing (and equally
desirable) format. Thus, the body of doctrine comes to appear as a vast
playing-out of tensions between competing values of community and autonomy, of security and freedom, of equality and individuality, and so
forth, in which no doctrinal formulation is inherently more legitimate
than any other. All express our shared values.
At this point, Critical Legal Studies reaches a fork in the road. One
path is to reject liberal values as guidance for decisionmaking by asserting that they are simply expressions of deep human ambivalence over
needing and fearing others. By viewing legal doctrine as a continuing
attempt to mediate the universal human contradiction between desires
for community and autonomy, one leans toward a renunciation of involvement in doctrinal disputes because neither community nor autonomy is inherently more desirable than the other. 122
An alternative path is to reformulate liberal ideals into some unified
122. This is the notion of a "fundamental contradiction" which was put forth in Kennedy, The
Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 209 (1979).
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vision of a just society where previously opposite desiderada converge
(where authentic individuality and autonomous development are realized
through the creation of supportive community). This then furnishes a
reference point for evaluating legal principles and case outcomes, but it
does so by contrasting the affirmative ideal with the results of particular
applications of rationalization formats in specific, concrete circumstances. The emphasis can no longer be on the desirability of rationalization formats in the abstract, but on the application codes which dictate
when they are applied and with what substantive effect.
We do not attempt to assess the moral status of the formats in general, but only when they are applied to particular, concrete, factual circumstances; the basis of the assessment being the particular effects under
the circumstances. Freedom of contract, although worthy in the abstract,
becomes evil when applied to strike down minimum wage and maximum
hour legislation for bakers.123 In other words, legal doctrine becomes
meaningful and eligible for normative validation through a series of confrontations with the actual social world. However, as soon as those confrontations are reported with any degree of accuracy and consistency, the
proposition that established doctrinal patterns are shaped by ideals is
swiftly undercut.
Although the opposing rationalization formats in legal doctrine express liberal values and ideals in the abstract, this expression does not
itself conform social relations to the ideals. To make legal outcomes even
approach the ideal, we would first need some concept of authenticity that
allowed us to register which of the two opposing formats' application in
the particular circumstances moved society closer to the ideal.
We would then need to construct application codes that were authentic in this sense. For example, in the transaction between parent and
kidnapper, any attempt to apply the ideal of voluntary, mutual exchange
would be inauthentic whereas applying the ideal of communal protection
would be authentic. Conversely, where the contractual transaction is between a bookseller and a person desiring to read some political or literary
achievement, the authenticity of the two formats of liberal and communal protection would be reversed.
Unfortunately, many of our settled, legally correct application codes
would fail this test. Consider how the law operates when a non-unionized
employee-at-will is laid off from his job because demand for his labor has
slackened. The consequences for the employee may be catastrophic and
123. See, eg., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

lead him to destitution; whereas requiring the employer to provide him
with another job would affect the employer's well-being only marginally.
An "authentic" application of our affirmative liberal ideal might well
deem the ideal of contractual freedom inapposite, and favor the contrary
ideal of paternal, governmental protection of welfare. Yet, established
legal principles do the opposite. The employer is required to provide another job only if it has voluntarily contracted to assume that obligation.
Nearly everyone knows that this is the law and accepts it as the law,
but as an application of ideals it seems perverse. The definition of the
employer-employee relationship as one of contractual freedom fails to
take account of the corporate employer's vastly greater wealth and
power, and of the employee's willingness to accept termination being the
product of duress, (she will be forcibly removed from the premises and
blacklisted or imprisoned if she defies the employer's order).
Viewed superficially the law appears to be a direct application of
liberal ideals because legal doctrine is composed of rationalization formats that articulate these ideals. However, as explained previously, the
formats exist in opposing pairs which taken together, but in isolation
from concrete factual situations, merely express contradictory human
yearnings for autonomy and community. If the formats themselves were
the law in toto, then the law would indeed be inchoate and incoherent. It
becomes ordered and coherent by maintaining consistent application
codes which choose between opposing formats in predictable ways in the
context of applying them to types of real situations. The shaping of these
codes theoretically provides an opportunity to realize liberal ideals by
favoring the format (and the corresponding result) which is more authentically applied in each situation. But in practice, this opportunity is frequently foregone because the less authentic application is chosen.
Inauthentic applications are pervasive because the existing social relations maintained by law are far more hierarchical and inegalitarian
than those implicit in the positive social vision behind the liberal ideals.
One of the central ironies of liberal democratic, capitalist societies is that
their deepest shared values and ideals tend to be those that were forged in
an assault on feudalist hierarchies, but their actual social relations which
they seek to legitimate with reference to these ideals resemble more the
feudalist hierarchies themselves. Thus, the law continuously faces a
choice between moving toward an affirmative liberal ideal and maintaining what exists. Most often its choice is the latter.
Two things keep it from becoming completely obvious that legal
principles are not shaped by shared values and ideals. The first is that
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most instances where principles embody inauthentic applications are so
traditional, familiar and uncontroversial that they are virtually never
questioned or litigated, and hence are conveniently invisible when legal
doctrine is discussed. The second is that law schools focus attention almost exclusively on judicial opinions. Thus, factual situations are viewed
only through the lens of opinion writers, and the only aspects of the situations likely to be viewed as salient in opinions are those that are consonant with the writer's effort to apply a rationalization format.
Nevertheless, awareness of the divergence between existing social relations and liberal values and ideals is difficult to escape. Since it is generally conceded that law operates to maintain these relations, it follows
that law works to maintain something quite different from underlying
values and ideals. Legal principles, which reflect and shape case outcomes on a daily basis, must therefore have an identity different from
that of liberal ideals. Otherwise there would be no way of accounting for
the pervasive forms of injustice that are left standing by, and are even
reinforced by, decisions that are legally correct applications of established principle. Such pervasive injustice can be downplayed and at times
ignored, but it cannot be denied altogether.
Persons who imagine that legal outcomes can be deduced from liberal ideals must contend with the fact that departures from liberal ideals
occur throughout the economy, which are pervasive and constrain all
other forms of social activity. Hence, the efforts of idealist formalism to
separate practical areas of law, such as contract and labor law, from areas where ideals govern, such as freedom of speech and due process, is
futile. Economic organization is of paramount importance in every area.
For example, the First Amendment free speech guarantee limits certain types of governmental interference with citizens' use of resources
(paper, podium, billboard, printing press, radio transmitter, news media
conglomerate) to disseminate ideas. Among the types of interference that
are not limited is the normal enforcement of property rights and protection of resource acquisitions through commercial market transactions.
Thus, the citizen who wishes to use instrumentalities of speech which he
neither owns nor is able to get the owner's permission to use may be
barred from such usage. Tremendous suppression of speech and constriction of the flow of ideas is implicit in the normal enforcement of property
rights. Such suppression is usually seen as unproblematic, but it shapes,
to a considerable degree, the concrete situations in which free speech
doctrine is applied. By shaping these situations, it affects the circum-

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

stances under which application of a rationalization format, such as "no
governmental interference with the flow of ideas," will appear authentic.
Thus, when all government regulation of access to instrumentalities
of speech is barred, the importance of private wealth and market transactions as determiners of access is heightened. If the distribution of wealth
and of market-based access to facilities is extremely unequal, then prevention of all government interference, including that which would have
a redistributive effect, may effectively result in heightened domination of
the populace by elites. Hence, the rationalization format of "unimpeded
individual liberty" comes to stand for protecting the liberty of the few at
the expense of the many-an application which most people would view
as inauthentic.
In other words, attempts to imagine freedom of speech being shaped
by a liberty ideal or an ideal of uninhibited self-expression fail because
free speech doctrine implicitly incorporates established economic organization, and insofar as such organization parts from underlying liberal
ideals, then established First Amendment principle will also diverge from
the ideals.
Proponents of idealist formalism must distract attention from such
vulgar economic realities in order to maintain the credibility of their enterprise. Sometimes their efforts to do so involve a sleight of hand. For
example, after positing an ideal principle (government may do nothing to
limit the flow of ideas) which they assert will or should determine the
totality of First Amendment doctrine, they may turn around and act as
though a particular doctrinal category (the state action requirement) has
elevated itself above the principle in order to limit the principle's reach.
Thus the argument goes, "government may do nothing to limit the
flow of ideas; true, the flow of ideas is limited by private ownership and
contractual transactions which determine who may control a newspaper
or purchase time on the broadcast media, but such forms of 'private censorship' do not involve state action and are thus outside the purview of
the First Amendment; even though they limit the flow of ideas and depend upon government's enforcement of property and contract law, they
do not undermine the free speech principle that government may do
nothing to limit the flow of ideas because the First Amendment only
applies where there is state action."
In reality, "state action," like all doctrinal categories, is malleable
and can be shaped to accord with the principle governing the doctrine as
a whole. There is nothing inherent in the concept of "state action" which
says that it cannot be interpreted to include the state's action in main-
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taining normal property and contract laws.124 Indeed, if the reigning
First Amendment principle were really "government may do nothing to
limit the flow of ideas," then "state action" would have to be interpreted
in this very broad way. The fact that "state action" is not defined so
broadly is evidence against the claim that the reigning First Amendment
principle is "government may do nothing to limit the flow of ideas."
To use existing "state action" doctrine as an explanation of why an
ideal principle fails to deliver the doctrinal results it promises involves a
sleight of hand. The proponent simultaneously asserts that legal doctrine
is shaped by ideal principles and that legal doctrine can transform principles into something other than what they are by limiting the range of
their applicability. This sleight of hand is possible because existing doctrine is shaped by something different than ideals, and having been so
shaped, it can stand apart from the ideals and limit their applicability.
3. HistoricallyContingentNecessity and the Claim of RadicalIndeterminacy. Due to the residual effects of legal realism's ascendancy during the New Deal period, formalist attempts to argue that legal outcomes
embody liberal ideals are met with skepticism. Contemporary formalists
usually prefer to don the outer trappings of realism by admitting that
harsh necessities deter courts from fully realizing ideals. But they remain
true to formalism's deeper agenda by portraying the necessities as universal needs of any modern, liberal industrial order. Hence the needs are
elevated above politics by being cast as needs of society itself, rather than
of any particular societal group or political agenda. They are portrayed
as inherent needs that any rational person would accept.
Critical Legal Studies' historical and comparative examinations of
legal systems subvert the formalist conception of abstract, universal necessity. Studies show that even when conceivably universal needs of modem industrial societies are identified, widely divergent legal forms and
rules appear capable of satisfying the same needs. 125 Thus, the formalist's
desire to dervive existing patterns of doctrine from abstract societal needs
is frustrated.
Moreover, studying the history of legal doctrine in this country
shows that legal concepts, which at any given point in time are portrayed
as having a fixed, uncontestible meaning, evolve over decades to take on
different meanings in accordance with the prevailing politics of the
1

124. See, e.g., Shelly v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
125. See Gordon, supra note 121.
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time. 126 Thus, counterpoints to contractual freedom like "fraud" and
"duress" will expand or diminish their range of applicability depending
upon whether laissezfairepolitical positions are in retreat or ascendance.
Such seemingly universal imperatives as the need to protect private property and keep public order were once seen as justifying prohibition of
assemblies in public parks, activities which forty years later had come to
be seen as essential for liberty, fully compatible with order, and an absolute right "from time immemorial."
The historical insights of Critical Legal Studies can be interpreted
either of two ways, both of which undermine formalism. An approach of
radical indeterminacy rejects all claims of necessity, saying that such
claims are nothing more than ideological assertions marshalled in support of actors in contingent power struggles. It also rejects all attempts to
posit any kind of functional determinism. Thus, the very assertion that a
body of legal doctrine is held together by its serving some underlying
societal function is suspect, regardless of how the function is depicted.
Radical indeterminacy's stark rejection of concepts of "function"
and "necessity" places it in opposition to efforts to construct realist conceptions of principle, which necessarily depend on such concepts. Since
doctrine cannot be portrayed as the outcome of any purely logical determinism, attempts to impute coherence and purposiveness to it must be
based on some sense of social function. Since normative validation of
realistically-defined legal principles depends on defining a "feasible"
range within which alternative principles may be compared, some concept of necessity is needed to sustain the boundary given the wide range
of conceivable social outcomes that fall outside it. The alternative to radical indeterminacy is provided by concepts of historically contingent necessity and scaled-down functional determinism. To say that a social
need is historically contingent is to assert on the one hand that it exists
only within a specific historical context, but on the other, that once its
context is set, it has the quality of necessity. Thus, if one asks, "Must
projectiles always fall to earth?" The answer is, "No, some projectiles are
outside the earth's gravitational pull; other have rockets that will propel
them beyond its pull." But if one asks, "Must a projectile situated in the
earth's atmosphere without any means of propulsion fall to earth?" Then
the answer may be, "Yes, this is necessary." The fact that other contexts
are imaginable, or even under certain circumstances achievable, does not
negate the possibility of necessity in a given context.
126.

See M. HoRwrTz, THE TRANSFORMATOIN OF AMERICAN LAW (1977).
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Since legal rules, decisions and orders are all exercises of state
power, one may infer that their feasible range is bounded by the limits of
such power in a given historical context. Because the state is by no means
omnipotent, and may even at times be surprisingly fragile, state power
must be exercised cautiously and with enough deference to civil society's
dominant, organized forces to avoid provoking exertions of private
power that would frustrate or sabotage major programs of governance.
The fact that constellations of private power depend upon political consciousness and may be transformed by political organizing does not deprive them of the capacity to create necessity in a given context where
the transformative organizing has not yet occurred. It merely means that
such necessity is always historically contingent.
Likewise, even though a given societal function will not necessitate
any specific pattern of legal outcomes for societies in general, once a specific pattern has developed in a particular society and context, the pattern
may be viewed as an intelligible, coherent strategy for serving the function. The fact that other ways might have been developed to serve the
same function does not deprive the chosen way of its functional character. Since the particular strategy that has been adopted will be faciliated
better by some types of case outcomes than others, its strategic, functional character may provide the basis for an outcome-determinative
legal principle. But the starting point for the principle is not the abstract,
universal needs of social order; it is the particular historical contingency
of this strategy having been adopted.
Radical indeterminists sometimes challenge the idea of historically
contingent necessity by arguing that it is a false appearance generated by
the inertia of existing power relations. Since power cannot long be exercised without the consent of those subjected to it, and such consent is a
manifestation of subjects' consciousness, indeterminists argue that subjects' freedom to alter their consciousness belies all historical necessity,
leaving only an inertia that can be spontaneously altered at any time.
The fallacy in this argument lies in its curious reliance on the formalist conception of legitimacy as pure, voluntary consent divorced from
underlying coercion. But if one adopts the realist mode of consent being
a self-protective response to latent coercion, then one would say that
human beings are not free to change their consciousness without first or
simultaneously altering the material basis of power. Since the historical
circumstances under which this may be done are limited and to some
degree predictable, one can envision historical periods free of such circumstances. Within any such period, a domain of politically feasible gov-
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erning strategies retains its historically contingent necessity, which in
turn provides the normative basis of legal principles.
Arguments in favor of radical indeterminacy are sometimes based
on the CLS "incoherence of doctrine" critique. Proponents assert that
legal doctrine is so infinitely malleable as to be incapable of supporting
any type of outcome-determinative principle. However, the "incoherence
of doctrine" critique does not really go so far. It can as well be read to
state that doctrine is an ordered, symbolic representation of governing
strategies which are not fully explicated in doctrine. Although doctrinal
use of symbols changes over decades, in at least most periods, there are
some shared meanings that attach to the symbols. Hence, what is incoherent is not the very idea of ordered doctrine or legal principles, but the
formalist attempt to depict principles as fully articulated within doctrine
itself. Radical indeterminacy's rejection of all conceptions of legal principle relies upon formalism in a curious way: it rejects formalism, but
adopts formalist criteria for deciding what might constitute valid legal
principles. Failure to meet these criteria of political neutrality and pure
analytic verification, is then used as a basis for dismissing realist conceptions of principle. Doctrine which purports to derive decisional outcomes
from the radical indeterminists argue that "principles" which are
presented as rationalizations for decisions are incoherent because these
"principles" do not account for the boundaries of their application. Thus,
any legal system that truly restricted itself to the formalist project of logically deriving outcomes from rationalizations would wind up with seemingly random applications of principle and counter-principle, and would
be in effect unprincipled, while claiming to be principled. Thus, it would
be incoherent.
In actuality, most CLS scholars acknowledge that law is not so random as this argument might suggest. They admit that some regularity is
imported through a somewhat uniform process of articulating "factual"
distinctions which define separate domains of principles and counterprinciples. Thus, we all know that "discrete and insular minority" means
a racial or ethnic minority, and not a socioeconomic class or a group
with sexual preferences that are seen as deviant. We know that "duress"
means one contracting party using explicit threats of force to achieve
results that are abnormally oppressive, rather than simply employing superior bargaining power and implicit threats of force to secure forms of
oppression that are customary in the trade.
These seemingly common-sense meanings of terms supply what coherence and regularity exists in the application of legal doctrine. How-
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ever, as soon as any close or interesting question is examined, it becomes
apparent that the "factual" categories are neither simple sensory perceptions nor neutral, logical categories of human association. Rather, they
are conclusory terms susceptible of a variety of meanings. They acquire
their specific meanings that allow them to generate reproducible legal
outcomes by incorporating the prevailing political conclusions of the period. Thus, Blacks and Puerto Ricans, and not gays, pot smokers or unemployed, come to be seen as suspect classes within the meaning of the
Equal Protection Clause even though all four groups are stigmatized and
disadvantaged minorities in fact. The difference is that the judiciary has
embarked upon a program to protect the former and not the latter.
At this point, the Critical Legal Studies critique must shift its focus.
It can no longer assert that outcomes are random as they would be if
only logical deduction based on "principles" were employed, but that the
criteria generating reproducible outcomes are neither fully explicated in
judicial opinions nor politically neutral. That which is presented as simply "factual" really incorporates conclusions reached through thought
processes intended to reflect the prevailing politics of the period. Thus,
the "incoherence" consists of the pretense that legal principles and reasoning are above politics when even a moderate amount of thought
shows that they are not. This critique would invalidate all functionalist,
realist-based conceptions of legal principle only if one of three things
were true: first, that such principles were predicated upon a differentiation of law from politics or ideology; second, that such principles could
not legitimately be based upon anything beyond the four corners of
printed judicial opinions and thus had to be constructed by a literal repetition of "principles" as they are expressed in opinions; or third, that
politics were so open-ended and constantly shifting in fundamental ways
as to lack the necessary stability to support any legal principles that endured long enough to be meaningful. The first is by definition false. The
second is a requirement only of the formalist mode of legitimation. Principles need be fully stated in judicial opinions only if opinions are viewed
as a process of arriving at results through an objective process of logical
deduction, the objectivity of which is attested to by its being contained
within opinions. Being contained in such a manner makes them reproducible, like the results of a scientific experiment, and this reproducibility
is taken as the hallmark of objectivity. Since realistic, functionalist principles are admittedly shaped by the prevailing politics or ideologies of the
period, they need not display any ritualistic demonstration of objectivity.
There need merely be shared ideological determinism which defines pre-
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ferred strategies of governance with sufficient clarity that they may be
applied consistently. As long as there is an intelligible connection between the strategies themselves and reasoning in opinions, the strategies
need only be reflected partially or symbolically in the opinions.
From a realist's perspective, statements of "principle" contained in
opinions are only parts of legal principles. They are the rationalization
formats employed by courts to express decisions arrived at through applications of principle that are only partially articulated. Because legal
principles encompass application codes as well as rationalization formats,
the fact that the formats do not specify their own boundaries in no way
invalidates the functionalist conception.
The third contention that politics is too open-ended to sustain conceptions of legal principle furnishes ground for debate, and may even be
defensible empirically for some areas of law in some periods. But when it
is elevated to the level of first premise and asserted to be generally and
always true it begins to seem unlikely.
Both the experience of those trying to radically alter existing society,
and the common-sense perception of politics as constrained within a relatively narrow ideological range suggests that the process is less openended than advocates of radical indeterminacy would like to believe. Indeed, the fact that judges and scholars see themselves as applying determinate legal principles may reflect a reality of sufficient political stability
to support such principles. But the continuing commitment to outmoded
formalist conceptions may have retarded attempts to concretize and articulate actual principles, which will be better understood and show a
closer correspondence with decisional outcomes if we search for coherent
strategies of managing conflict rather than close approximations of
ideals.
C.

CriticalFunctionalistReconstruction of Legal Principles

To fairly reject both radical indeterminacy and formalism, one
should be able to posit conceptions of legal priciple that comport with
realist insights. Another way of saying this is that once law has been
subsumed within politics, we may still preserve the idea of lawfulness by
depicting at least some facets of politics as an ordered process. But an
ordered process of doing what? Not of maximizing values, but of preserving the legitimacy of evolving patterns of social relations. The approach
which I term "critical functionalism" provides a background analytical
framework for generating such conceptions of principle. Since this approach is avowedly a way of synthesizing realism and principle, its con-
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tours are shaped by its needing to incorporate realist insight while
satisfying legal principles' three requirements of feasibility, outcome-determinativeness and normative validation. A commitment to realism encompasses two closely related goals - a capacity to cogently depict and
explain actual legal patterns, which includes the ability to account for
historical change, and a willingness to portray social relations as involving domination and latent conflict, rather than as a basically consensual
process of actualizing shared values.
To achieve this synthesis, critical functionalism views legal principles as strategies for maintaining the legitimacy of the social system. But
it concedes this consent of the governed does not occur "naturally" based
on shared values. Rather, this consent is manufactured partly by an
ongoing manipulation of the populace, using threats of coercion and disseminating forms of consciousness that extol acquiescence. Legal doctrine generates and amplifies such consciousness, but it also dictates how
the state's coercive power is to be distributed and applied. Doctrinal patterns embodying legal principles are held together by their strategic value
in managing social conflict, which in turn involves sustaining networks of
institutions that legitimize and reproduce established power relations.
Described in this way, principles cannot lay claim to normative validity
simply because they are principles; rather, normative validation must occur in two stages. First by bounding the range of feasible, alternative
strategies, and then, by choosing those alternatives which are preferable
from the standpoint of underlying ideals.
This process of setting political boundaries and acknowledging alternative ordering strategies within their confines is realized by operationalizing the abstractions of "system" and "strategy." Both terms connote
patterns of social relations; those that constitute the "system" are imbued
with an historically contingent necessity that makes their fundamental
alteration unfeasible in a given historical period. Social relations that
constitute "strategies" are seen as mutable, and hence the focus of political-legal debate. As social movements emerge and decline, and prevailing political moods and prospects change accordingly, the precise
formulation of which relations are "strategies" and which comprise "the
system" may be altered. But the process of change is usually slow
enough, and major shifts are infrequent enough, that one may meaningfully define boundaries that will apply over a duration of several or more
127
decades.
127. See id..
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Because critical functionalism stresses the integrated, interrelated
functioning of institutions, it is likely to portray the deeper meaning of
doctrinal patterns less in terms of discrete goals pursued by a given area
of law in isolation, than in terms of the patterns' contribution to the ascendance or dismantling of broader strategies of governance that encompass many areas of law and define society's principal political cleavages.
Thus, many areas of law may appear as theaters of conflict in a multifronted contest between basic corporatist and social democratic ordering
strategies.
Alternatively, certain areas may appear as the consistent, secure
sanctuaries of one strategy or the other. For example, I have argued that
First Amendment "free speech" doctrine has maintained a structure of
core-absolutist and broader discretionary protection that has favored social democratic strategies of governance. Comprehending this structure
allows us to argue that particular First Amendment decisions favoring
corporatist strategies of governance are anomalous. Conversely, the
complex of statutory and constitutional anti-discrimination law may best
be understood as a clash between two alternative strategies-one seeking
a racial homogenization of the class structure in order to minimize risks
associated with interaction of latent class and racial conflicts; the other
seeking stability in the context of current levels of racial inequality by
preventing racial identities from developing into a type of class consciousness.128 This has involved protecting the presently small, non-white
middle class from effects of institutional racism and requiring that systematic reproduction of racial inequality be accomplished without open
animosity or expressions of discriminatory intent that could likely provoke collective opposition.
Of course, such formulations admit that law is highly political.
However, critical functionalism does not seek to elevate law above the
clash of ideologies, as do formalist principles. Rather it seeks to illuminate the complex ways in which doctrine is a continuing manifestation of
this very clash. The grounding of legal principles in political conflict,
rather than in consensual values, is the logical outgrowth of a basic realist orientation. Conceiving of principles in this way does not invalidate
them normatively, but it exposes the political nature of attempts to validate them.
The extent to which normative debate over legal principles may be
"open-ended" and concern the basic terms of social life is historically
128.

See Freeman, supra note 67.
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contingent and depends upon the strength of the inertia of power in a
given period. Such inertia in turn depends upon the extent to which
power is concentrated in groups that are fundamentally allied with one
another, and upon social institutions success in keeping major conflicts
latent. Constellations of power generate for each historical period its
plausible range of alternative models of governance. With a critical functionalist approach, this range is reflected in the way concepts of "system"
and "strategy" are operationalized. One asks which alternative strategies
can or have been explicitly set forth as legitimate possibilities, as opposed
to those which are rejected out of hand by being depicted as contrary to
the (temporarily) unalterable requirements of the "system". Thus, one
may look to the legitimate political spectrum as providing a range of
feasible strategies, and to those things which are never seriously challenged as constituting the system. While one might argue that such an
approach crystalizes temporary political hegemony into a conception of
fixed system, the response is that the "system" abstraction merely
pragmatically incorporates limitations stemming from the historically
contingent necessity imposed by established power. The fact that it is
temporary or historically contingent, does not negate the possibility of
actual, albeit time-bound, necessity.
D. CriticalFunctionalism as Synthesizer of Realism and Principle
There are as many different types of functionalism as there are of
politics. Many people associate the term "functionalist" with the relatively conservative and formalist-leaning functionalism of Talcott Parsons which stresses the independent role of shared values in sustaining a
static and fundamentally consensual social order.29 But functionalism is
equally evident in the work of Karl Marx who views legal and other
cultural institutions as parts of an integrated system designed to perpetuate domination by the capitalist class.1 30 Because Marx saw the capitalist
class's very existence as antithetical to the primary values of liberalism,
which he espoused, Marx produced a type of inverted, radical functionalism which conceived of the system's very success as a collective misfortune. Because critical functionalism is designed to synthesize realism and
conceptions of legal principle, it must eschew both Parsonian and Marxist extremes. It cannot conceive of the social system as fundamentally
anti-social because to do so would deny normative validity at the outset
129. T. PARSONS, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM (1951).
130. 1 K. MARX, CAPITAL (1906); see also N. POULANTZES, SOCIAL CLASSES (1975); L. ALTHUSSER, FOR MARX (1970); J. CONNOR, THE FISCAL CRISIS OF THE STATE (1973).
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to all strategies of system maintenance, and thus to all functionalist legal
principles. But it also cannot view existing social relations as a manifestation of shared values operating independently of power. Doing that
would reinforce legal formalism, thereby precluding realism and defeating the purpose for which functionalism was being used in the first place.
Critical functionalism's middle ground is defined by five basic postulates. These are:
1. all existing social relations, including expressions of shared values, are
the product of existing forms of power and domination;
2. power and domination per se are neither good nor bad because they
are in some form necessary and inevitable;
3. the existing social system has a capacity for adaptation and thus can
be reproduced by a variety of strategies, all of which maintain its basic
infrastructure of power relations;
4. some of the strategies and their associated distributions or exercises of
power are more desirable and less odious than others;
5. because it is possible to comprehend patterns of governmental decisions as comprising coherent strategies, and the range of feasible strategies within a given historical period is limited, one may formulate
alternative legal principles and validate them normatively through a
competition among feasible alternatives.
A critical functionalist approach does not construe legal doctrines
abstractly in a way that is divorced from the total societal context. Thus,
it does not ask how a given doctrine by itself realizes a given value.
Rather, it asks how the doctrine operates in conjunction with others to
reproduce the system of power and social relations as a whole. Hence,
courts are seen as the loci of power in an integrated system of governance
which includes both legislative and excutive branches as well as the various "private governments" that wield power throughout civil society. In
this sense, all governmental decisionmaking is equally political.
By choosing one strategy of system maintenance over others, decisionmakers implicitly favor or disfavor shared values. But this difference
is always incremental and the strategies never approach being bona fide
efforts to realize values fully. The coherence of bodies of legal doctrine
stems from the strategies, not from any deeper or inner meanings of the
values themselves. Strategies, by definition are meaningful only in particular historical contexts marked by specific imperatives that necessitate
and guide strategic responses. Since the distribution of power determines
which social groups will be capable of pressing imperatives with sufficient
effect to command the state's attention, the legitimation and stabilization
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of social relations involves, above all, accommodating the demands of the
powerful. This accommodation generally results in the reproduction of
power relations themselves.
That the judiciary strives generally to implement strategies of system maintenance and of legitimation can be seen by comparing definitions of these concepts with commonplace observations about the judicial
role. "System maintenance" denotes a continuing attempt to preserve
patterns of social relations by alleviating the strains - or contradictions,
or conflicts - that threaten the patterns and their legitimacy.
Thus, judicial decisionmaking is addressed to social conflicts. It
seeks to produce a stable resolution of such conflicts and to the threats to
stability that are thereby posed. Judges want and expect to have their
orders obeyed, and they aspire to prescribe rules of conduct that will be
adhered to generally, not just by the particular litigants before them.
Hence, courts seek to dictate patterns of social behavior for the social
system as a whole.
The fact that they are reproducing patterns rather than creating
them anew is reflected in their concern with following precedents. Courts
believe that the validity of their decisions depends heavily on their consistency with prior decisions of other courts dealing with similar matters.
As between recent precedents and ancient ones, it is the recent ones that
are considered more important. For courts to overrule ancient precedents
when social circumstances have changed is viewed as entirely proper. But
to overrule recent precedents is considered bad form. The concern is not
with preserving tradition, but with avoiding abrupt shifts. Accordingly,
judicial opinions often appeal to settled expectations and to customary
ways of doing things. The fact that something is customary will often be
thought to make it legally correct unless the custom undermines something else which is customary. In other words, the concern is with facilitating a slow and orderly evolution of existing patterns.
The definition of society as a social system assumes that the different
agencies which exercise power are at least loosely coordinated with one
another. Critical functionalism leaves open the question of the extent to
which decisionmakers have a conscious awareness of coordination, but it
views legal doctrine and consciousness as symbolic systems designed to
facilitate coordination.
Thus, doctrine reveals courts perennially striving to defer to other
agencies which exercise power. This tendency is reflected in numerous
legal doctrines such as, "the business judgment rule," which defers to
corporate directors; the concept of. "federalism," which defers to state
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legislatures and agencies; the idea of discerning legislative intent, which
defers to legislatures, state or federal; the "political question" and 'lseparation of powers" doctrines, which defer to the federal executive and legislature; the concept of "majoritarianism," which defers to Whatever
group is sufficiently powerful to have acquired predominant influence in
Congress; the concept of "not inquiring into the mental processes of the
decisionmaker," which defers to administrative agencies; the concept of
respect for "marital privacy," which defers to the most powerful (and
sometimes violent) member of the family, and so forth.
Consistent with the general pattern of deference to power is the fact
that major judicial reforms, such as occurred with free-speech doctrine in
the 1930's13' and post-World War II anti-discrimination law, 132 tend to
occur when the other branches of government are moving in parallel to
implement similar kinds of reforms. For example, the New Deal transformation of labor law and the series of post-war civil rights acts and
orders (integrating the armed forces by executive order to the Civil
Rights Act of 1964). Likewise, in the late 19th century when other
branches of government were engaged in policies to promote the accumulation of capital, the judiciary was effecting a transformation of the
common law for the same apparent purpose. It assumes that except during rare historical moments the coordination is sufficiently successful
that power relations are reproduced and perceived as legitimate. The
fruit of this success is an inertia of power which makes social change
difficult. Legal rules are seen as devices for reproducing power relations
which are shaped in return by exercises of power and of coordination
among powerful agencies.
In any given historical period, there are strains in the social system
which inspire functional adaptation that entails changing some patterns
of social relations in order to restabilize and relegitimate the power relations that remain. That such change is possible within the context of an
evolving social system necessitates a distinction between the system itself
and strategies of system maintenance, Which are efforts to devise social
patterns for the benefit and stability of the system as a whole.
Insofar as legal rules evolve over decades, they are presumed to embody strategies of system maintenance. Those that rest unchanged may
be characterized as constituting either a consistent strategy of govern131. See Kairys, supra note 57; Gabel, The Mass Psychology of the New Federalism: How the
Burger Court's PoliticalImagery Legitimizes the Privatizationof Everyday Life, 52 GEO. WASH.L.
REv. 263 (1984).
132. See PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 57.
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ance or the social system itself, depending upon whether their alteration
in the near future seems politically plausible.
An essential aspect of system maintenance is legitimation. By legitimating the patterns of social relations that comprise the social system,
ruling authorities both enhance the stability of these patterns and affect
the quality of experience of the people involved. Thus, to legitimate existing patterns of social relations is to generate mentalities among subject
populations which lead them to perceive their servitude as something
they voluntarily accept, either because it is "freedom" or because it is
"necessity." This allows the underlying threat of violent coercion to
remain latent, and for the society to enjoy a higher level of security and
nonviolence than would otherwise be the case. Because underlying coercion supports popular perceptions of legitimacy, one cannot properly
speak of a society ordered by legitimacy as opposed to coercion. Thus, to
pose the question: "Is society governed by consent and legitimacy, on the
one hand, or by force and coercion on the other?" is to fundamentally
misunderstand the concept of legitimation. It is like asking: "Is the
human body supported by its skeleton or its muscles?" The more muscles
a body has, the more easily it stands and walks. But it is difficult to imagine how muscles would function without an underlying skeleton to which
they could be attached.
Legitimation involves not only the manufacture of appropriate consciousness, but also the readjustment of social relations to curtail or diminish exercises of power, the acceptance of which would undercut the
legitimacy of the social system as a whole. It would be a gross mistake to
perceive the legitimation process as simply a setting forth of models of
consciousness. Thus to argue, as some CLS scholars appear to do,' 3 3 that
outcomes of court cases are unimportant because judicial decisions are
nothing more than legitimation of the existing system is incorrect insofar
as it overlooks the possibility that the choice of one legitimation strategy
over another can make a substantial difference in people's lives.
To speak of "legitimation strategies" is essentially the same as to
speak of "strategies of system maintenance". The terms have connotations that emphasize different aspects of the process. The former emphasizes the generation of consciousness and the striving toward voluntary
acceptance; the latter focuses on the fact that legitimation is in the service of, and constrained by, the most fundamental, well-fortified forms of
established power. These typical patterns of judicial behavior - the con133. See, eg., Peller, supra note 70; Dalton, supra note 55; Freeman, supra note 55.
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cern with stability and general compliance, with precedents, with deference to power, and with coordination between the judiciary and other
governing entities - reflect the judiciary's primary commitment to maintaining a smoothly functioning, slowly evolving social system. Indeed,
the metaphor of society as a social system connotes little more than stability, slow evolution, and coordination among influential agencies; all
oriented towards preserving the authority and dominance relationships
that comprise the infrastructure of existing social relations. The judiciary's commitment to legitimation is reflected in its continuing efforts to
appeal to liberal ideals, especially to the ideal of governance based on
rational consent of the governed. Virtually all judicial opinions that attempt any substantial justification of their results will in one way or another appeal to this idea. The opinions may speak of social necessity and
of compelling interests, which suggest that anyone who seriously considered the situation would accept the result voluntarily. They may portray
their results as being dictated by "reason", or as necessary for "a free
society", all of which make the same essential point.
This appeal to "governance by rational consent", although consistent and seemingly earnest, generally takes place within a carefully circumscribed context of not disrupting society's established coercive
relationships, except insofar as those are seen as illegitimate because they
either are out of line with established practice or are thought likely to
destabilize other coercive relationships. In other words, although the
professed goal of lawmaking is voluntary consent, little is done to interfere with ongoing coercion. This combination suggests that its real purpose is to inspire forms of consciousness which encourage voluntary
compliance with social patterns that would be generated by direct coercion in the absence of such compliance. This is what is meant by "legitimation of an existing order." Critical functionalism views legitimation
and system maintenance as background conceptions that are encoded
into a shared conception of judicial role. Courts routinely interpret precedents and pronouncements in ways that allow them to remain faithful to
these underlying purposes. Viewing precedents as ways of achieving these
purposes allows courts to perceive reasonably definite meaning in received doctrine. Such perceptions constitute an intuitive grasp of legal
principles and channel decisionmaking to produce reasonably consistent
application codes. However, due to the prevalence of formalist discourse,
the political-strategic nature of the enterprise cannot be acknowledged.
So the coherence and purposiveness, which are real, are mistakenly portrayed as formal or logical; a characterization which is unreal.
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To grasp the actual coherence one must conceptualize patterns of
related doctrine and then ask what latent or manifest conflicts they have
been designed to address, which power relations have been reproduced or
delegitimized, and why. One must ask what types of institutions have
been perpetuated or altered by the doctrinal patterns' selective reproduction of power relations. Critical functionalist interpretation views key
phrases in judicial opinions as symbols of aspects of governing strategies;
the orderly repetition of such phrases is seen as constituting a symbolic
reflection of the strategies themselves.
E. The PoliticalTilt of CriticalFunctionalism
Notwithstanding the history of antagonism between CLS and liberals, the CLS-indeterminacy critique may actually favor the cause of social democratic liberalism. This is because legal formalism implicitly
favors political conservatism, usually in the form of corporatist ordering
strategies, whereas a merger of realism and principle would incline toward a social democratic, or progressive reformist, strategy of governance. 34 The political leanings of realism and formalism are not absolute;
either sort of political agenda can be articulated through the medium of
either philosophical approach. But there is a tilt in the sense that each
approach has a greater congeniality toward one strategy or the other.
Legal realism tends to highlight, and legal formalism tends to obscure,
those aspects of social life that reveal glaring divergence between pluralist corporatism and underlying liberal ideals. Thus, realism amplifies and
formalism downplays the intellectual predicates of the strongest arguments in favor of social democracy. Consequently, arguments in favor of
corporatist strategies appear cynically elitist and morally dubious when
expressed in a realist framework, while proponents of social democracy
tend to become intellectually incoherent when forced to use the language
of formalism. This thesis will be developed in the article's remaining
segments.
1. One-Dimensionality of Formalist Reasoning. To begin with,
there is something intrinsically conservative in the formalist's attempt to
link legal principles with ideals. The implicit message is that the existing
social relations, the maintenance of which is encoded into established
legal principles, are virtually ideal. Even when imperfection is acknowledged, the very methodology of attempting to deduce the legal order
from shared values and ideals discourages formalists from attempting to
134.
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use ideals critically as a reservoir of desirable possibilities. In order to
sustain the plausibility of efforts to equate legal rules and liberal ideals,
sensibilities must be dulled at both ends. Coercive, inegalitarian aspects
of the existing order must be overlooked; ideals are required to retain a
vague, hazy quality that prevents them from being sharply concretized in
ways that would highlight the imperfection of present social arrangements. The conservatism of formalist thought derives not only from its
one-dimensionality, but also from the particular substance of what is being idealized. Most frequently, this.is the relations of the market, which
are depicted as an aggregation of free choices by universal abstract individuals. Since the principal distinction between pluralist corporatism on
the right and social democracy on the left concerns the extent to which
government, rather than markets, will control the production and distribution of goods, the glorificaiton of market relations that is implicit in
formalism's idealization of contract law undoubtedly favors the right.
The idealization of market relations can be expressed directly and affirmatively, as in formalism's rendition of free contracts between assenting
individuals, or indirectly and residually, as with the libertarian's backhanded glorification of private, market-based coercion that is implicit in
his principled rejection of governmental coercion. In constitutional law,
legislative decisionmaking is frequently idealized and construed to represent an authentic register of majority will. 135 While realists would view
the creation of legislative majorities as an expression of prevailing power
relations, or hegemony, formalists assume that the mere form of representative democracy suffices to authenticate the substantively democratic
character of the outcomes. Hence, legislative action is presumed democratic in the same a priori way that contracts are presumed free. The
result of this is to sanctify the programs of dominant governing coalitions. Since such a coalition may be by definition either center left or
center right, the formalist concept of "majoritarianism" is less inherently
conservative than its libertarian, contractual counterpart. Nevertheless,
recent decades have seen "majoritarianism" invoked most frequently
against the relatively progressive civil rights and civil liberties initiatives
of the federal judiciary.
Formalism also idealizes existing customs and patterns of association generally. To the extent that they are portrayed as natural or freely
chosen, rather than as shaped by power, the groundwork is laid for
claiming that any attempt at reform impinges on people's freedom to
135.

See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).
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associate as they choose. Thus, when federal authorities supported the
Civil Rights Movement's efforts to dismantle the southern states' castelike system of racial segregation, conservatives were able to argue that
forced integration violated freedom of association. To the realist, however, forced integration merely involved a more benign system of coercive power supplanting a less benign one.
2. The Implicit Conservatism of "Neutrality" and "Consensus"
The belief that legal principles can be politically neutral is central to the
formalist's effort to separate law from politics. However, from the perspective of a realist or critical functionalist it is unclear what meaning, if
any, "neutrality" can have with regard to ordered patterns of legal doctrine. Every legal principle at least implicitly favors or supports some
types of social relations and disfavors others; hence, it maintains some
distributions of power and precludes others. Since actual neutrality is
achievable only when outcomes are trivial or irrelevant,1 36 the question
for the realist is: "What substantive agendas are furthered by a quest for,
or pretense of, neutrality?"
Such agendas tend to be conservative because they further concentrate power in the hands of political and economic elites by discouraging
the formation of diverse political identities and refusing to legitimize
ongoing political conflict. Because the claim of neutrality is readily belied
by the existence of conflict, attempts to preserve the appearance of neutrality are likely to generate rules that suppress conflict, and by so doing,
enhance existing forms of hegemony. Similarly, attempting to portray existing social relations as authentically consensual involves a denial of
conflict and a tendency to support the denial by keeping conflicts from
becoming manifest. Conversely, realism's conception of law as conflictmanagement transfers some of the inherent legitimacy of law to expressions of underlying conflicts, which are seen as part of, rather than extrinsic to, the legal process. This is likely to broaden political
participation by favoring rules that allow expressions of conflict to be
manifest. To the extent that social structure is denied, and the only conflict recognized as legitimate is between individuals, political participation tends to be narrowed because only elites have sufficient power and
resources to affect society by acting individually. Realism, by contrast,
favors collective action both by recognizing the imperfect, implicitly coercive nature of existing relations, and by acknowledging the legitimacy
of cleavages between social groups. Critical functionalism's concept of
136.
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system maintenance through ongoing alteration of power relationships
favors social democracy by asserting that class conscious challenges to
existing domination are assimilable within the democratic political system. This assertion justifies a renunciation of political violence and imbues class conscious movements of non-elite groups with some of the
legitimacy associated with substantive democratic governance. Indeed,
realism's attempts to comprehend social structure make it possible to discuss social stratification and class consciousness in a way that formalism's portrayal of society as universal individuals and consensual unity
does not.
Formalism's denial of social structure obscures contradictions contained within the structure. 137 Insofar as the acknowledgment of such
contradictions furnishes strong support for social democratic meliorist
policies, denial and obscurantism favor corporatist ordering strategies.
The most fundamental contradiction in this regard is between formal
equality of right, and substantive inequalities of power and privilege. Because the liberal political theory that defines the horizons of mainstream
American political consciousness was first forged in a strugle against feudalism, it has as its first premise a rejection of legally defined hereditary
privilege in favor of the idea of formal equality before the law. All people
are assumed to have the same basic legal or political rights by virtue of
their sharing the role as free and equal citizens. At the same time however, the bureaucratized market economy generates vast inequalities of
power and privilege which are continuously in tension with the concept
of formal equality. It is the task of the legal system to reproduce, with
occasional alterations, these patterns of power and privilege. Yet the law
cannot transparently favor one societal group over the others because to
cast aside all pretension of neutrality would violate the underlying premises of formal equality. Because of the lurking tension between formal
equality of right and substantive inequality of outcomes, normative validation is always problematic and legal doctrine must be oriented toward
ameliorating the tension.
Two conceptual strategies are available for this task, and it is politically significant which of the two is followed. The one that I will call
"incrementalism" is associated with critical functionalism and favors social democratic, reformist liberalism; "obscurantism," by contrast, epitomizes legal formalism and tends to favor corporatist strategies, or
intransigent conservatism. Incrementalism focuses on inequalities of
137.
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power and asserts that because of an underlying stability of power relations, changes in existing relations can only occur within a fairly narrow
range. It then restricts itself to considering the range of politically feasible outcomes, assessing them in terms of their incremental amelioration,
or exacerbation of the tension between formal equality of right and substantive inequality of outcomes. Once questions are framed in this way,
they will tend to suggest incrementally egalitarian, welfare-oriented reforms as correct legal outcomes. Incrementalism recognizes the contradiction between formal equality and substantive inequality and then
harnasses it to propel a drift toward progressive, welfare-oriented
reforms.
Obscurantism avoids this drift by not recognizing or acknowledging
the contradiction. It makes the tension between formal equality and substantive inequality disappear from view by downplaying the importance
of specific social identities and confining legal analysis to an examination
of the exterior manifestations of social relations. Hence, all contractual
transactions having an exterior form of mutual assent, are presumed to
signify relations which are free and voluntary, and thus, are not seen as
the proximate result of exercises of power. By treating social relations as
being between abstract, generalized "free" persons, rather than expressions of particular historically embedded power relations, obscurantism
effectively declares inequalities of wealth and power "off limits" for legal
analysis. It thus superficially resolves the tension and deprives liberal reformism of a major source of justification.
The principle of "strict color blindness," currently being invoked by
the right wing to undo affirmative action programs, is an illuminating
example of obscurantism at work.138 Nowhere is the tension between formal equality of right and substantive inequalities of weath and power
more acute than in antidiscrimination law. Although racial equality has
been strenuously affirmed at the formal level of legal rights, substantive
inequalities of income and employment opportunities for blacks and
whites have been abated only minimally. 139 Opponents of affirmative action seek to resolve the tension by confining analysis to the exterior forms
of discrete interracial transactions viewed in isolation. Hence, any transaction will be viewed as either lawfully color-blind or invidiously
prejudiced. By declaring "off limits" the matter of unequal power relations between races and confining analysis to whether external indicia of
138. See, eg., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989) (effectively overruling
other post-Bakke cases that had previously upheld remedial quota affirmative action plans).
139. See D. BELL, supra note 75, at 26-50.
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bigotry are present,"4° obscurantism accomplishes two things: it deprives
proponents of affirmative action of the sources of justification that stem
from awareness of how superficially color-blind transactions can perpetuate effects of past discrimination (also known as institutional racism) and
it allows the opponents to assert that intentional racial preference in
favor of blacks is as bad as intentional preference in favor of whites. By
contrast, reformist liberals generally favor affirmative action on the
ground that it incrementally reduces substantive racial inequalities of
power and privilege. In other words, it ameliorates the tension between
formal equality of right and substantive inequality of condition. Thus, it
is the acknowledgment of inequalities of power that makes compensatory
discrimination in favor of minorities qualitatively different than discrimination against them.
Beyond the incrementalist approach to the contradiction between
formal equality and substantive inequality, realist legitimation favors social democratic policies by elevating values of non-violence and power
sharing to positions of primary importance. By acknowledging that law
stabilizes and legitimizes coercive, imperfect relations, realists portray
the legitimation process as a tradeoff in which people forego radical possibilities of improved social relations in return for a guaranteed high level
of nonviolence. The more state violence is employed to maintain order,
the less rational basis there appears to be for the populace to consent to
the stabilization of existing forms of association. By rejecting the formalist's claim that existing relations are optimal - either because they comport with ideals or because they are transcendantly necessary - realists
construe the state's legitimacy to depend crucially on its ability to maintain order with a minimum of state violence. This then limits officials'
prerogatives to use repressive strategies in lieu of liberal accommodationist ones. Similarly, the defensibility of popular consent comes to depend
increasingly upon claims of the existing social system's political elasticity. Stabilization of imperfect patterns is more easily justified as rational
if its main effect is to gradualize change so as to make it orderly and
nonviolent rather than if change is thwarted althogether. Hence, those
legal rules that enhance the system's capacity for peaceful accommodation and change acquire an overriding importance in realist legitimation.
Such rules tend to be principal elements of social democratic ordering
strategies.
140. See, ag., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (establishing an intent requirement
under Fourteenth Amendment).
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3. The PoliticalSignificance of Framers'Intent. In Constitutional
law, the formalist's quest for neutral principes leads to attempts to derive
contemporary constitutional doctrine from analyses of what the framers
intended in 1789. To the extent this exercise is pursued earnestly as opposed to being used as a mantle under which more serious policy analysis
is undertaken, the message is that constitutional law, which today plays a
vital role in the allocation of political and economic power, ought to be
shaped in accordance with the wishes of a group of gentlemen who represented the American upper classes some two hundred years ago.
To the realist or critical functionalist, such a proposition borders on
the absurd because legal doctrine is seen as a dependent variable shaped
in response to cultural change and the recent formalism of social movements. The proposition is plausible only to the formalist who sees doctrine as an independent variable that hangs as a connected whole above
ongoing political disputes and connects the present with the past by reducing both to a consistent abstract conception. Whether the concern
with "framers' intent" is truly reactionary or merely a way of preserving
deep-seated liberal values necessarily depends upon how it is applied.
However, the formalist's reliance on such intent to provide determinate
outcomes for actual cases leads to literal, ahistorical applications that
disproportionately favor corporatist ordering strategies of the right wing.
A brief historical consideration of social structure tells us why.
The United States, like all developed liberal market societies, has
evolved from being a predominantly agrarian economy with a plethora of
independent enterprises, to being a complex, industrialized bureaucratic
economy where the majority are employed by enterprises controlled by a
few. The intrinsic tendency in capitalist development toward a centralization of wealth and power has created a potential for effective political
disenfranchisement and widespread impoverishment of the majority of
the population. This potential, with its serious destabilizing consequences, has been kept from coming to fruition by increasing state intervention and regulation of the economy and polity during the twentieth
century. Such regulation has been designed to mitigate the most destructive aspects of competition, and thus to preserve a large, although increasingly bureaucratized and dependent, middle class; thereby insuring
that only a minority is at any given time impoverished. The society thus
has evolved into an amalgam of two ordering conceptions: a .marketbased private economy, and with it, an overlay of pervasive regulation by
a democratically-controlled, partially welfare-oriented capitalist state.
The major political conflicts within the established system of gov-
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ernance, and hence the major clashes of competing legal principles during this century, have turned on the extent to which the overlay of
welfare-oriented state regulation should be expanded or curbed. Thus,
concern has focused on "freedom of contract" as a pretext (or principled
basis) for invalidating welfare legislation, on freedom of speech and equal
protection as ways of expanding the political base of the welfare state, on
the meaning of "property" within the Due Process Clause as a symbolic
battle over whether welfare-state entitlements shall be constitutionally
guaranteed. The meaning of a concern with "framers' intent" and of formalist conceptions of principle should be understood with reference to
the role they play in this larger political question. Two things are then
clarified. First, the framers of the U.S. Constitution existed at a much
earlier point in the historical process of capitalist accumulation. Thus,
they witnessed, comprehended, and favored a lesser degree of welfareoriented state regulation than most people would now favor. However,
this relative lack of regulation at that historical period corresponded to a
less extreme centralization of wealth and power than it would if transplanted into the twentieth century. From a functionalist perspective,
such an absence of correspondence in social consequences totally invalidates attempts to invoke the framers' political choices with sufficient literalness and exactness to derive legal principles from them. Nevertheless,
if the framers' choices are invoked with any attempt at historical accuracy, they will tend systematically to favor entrenched conservatism because they will reflect the ideological underpinnings of a predominantly
unregulated market society.
So it is not surprising that the Warren Court's attempt to base reformist liberal decisions upon "the framers' intent" resulted in an intellectual embarrassment of significant proportions. Some contemporary
reformist liberals argue that the framers should be seen as having established a political theory which furnishes a normative basis for evaluating
legal results, but should not be conceived of as having elaborated outcome-determinative principles that shape specific legal outcomes for future generations. This qualified use of framers' intent accords nicely with
a critical functionalist conception that sees legal principles as embodying
contemporary strategies of system maintenance, and then looks to longstanding, widely-shared liberal ideals to assess the relative desirability of
competing strategies. However, if invoked within a context of continued
commitment to formalist principles, the reformist liberal's qualified use
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of "framers' intent" becomes incoherent.14 For if the framers' intent
does not determine outcomes of constitutional adjudication, then what
other source could there be with the necessary grounding in tradition and
consensual validity to generate the appearance of constitutional principles being "above politics?"
4. Realist Principles and the Incorporation of Civil Disobedience
into Legitimate Resources of Lawmaking. By asserting that legal principles reflecting existing relations are "above politics," the formalist approach presumes that they are and ought to be immune to alteration by
pressure from political movements. This underlying opposition between
principle and political change poses a dilemma for reformist liberals. If
formalist principles are not to be intransigently conservative, they either
must be so vague and open-ended as to no longer be outcome determinative, which then undercuts their value as legal principles, or they must
suddenly and inexplicably become open to change when social conditions
make possible progressive reforms that conflict with earlier principles.
When established principles conflict with change, the reformist liberal
must either disavow the change in favor of the principle, or admit that
the legal system is properly shaped by something more fundamental and
entitled to greater respect than its principles. This then discredits the
formalist conception which asserts that immutable ideals fashioned into
principles constitute the most fundamental authority for legal outcomes.
This quandary is particularly acute for reformist liberals because the
legal doctrines that they most value and wish to see enshrined as principles have emerged as the national elite's accommodating responses to
progressive social movements. Thus, equal protection doctrine and antidiscrimination law have emerged in response to the domestic civil rights
movement and the world-wide movement against apartheid. Freedom of
speech became the law of the land two decades earlier in conjunction
with New Deal labor law reform.142 The formalist assumption that legal
principles are above politics and should not be affected by political pressure runs counter to the easily demonstrable historical facts that civil
rights and civil liberties have developed in response to the pressures generated by political movements. This fact poses less difficulty for functionalist conceptions of legal principle because these conceptions assume that
constitutional rights develop in response to societal strains and thus are
the result of political pressures.
141. See Tushnet, supra note 13.
142. See M. SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1966); Kairys, supra note 57.
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To justify formation of new principles, political pressures must be of
sufficient magnitude to warrant changes in legal structure, and the
changes must be amenable to being codified into an ordering strategy
that enhances legitimacy and ensures nonviolence as well or better than
the earlier strategy that had come under attack. To the extent that a
functionalist model of society allows a significant role for conceptions of
latent contradiction or strain, it will recognize the propriety of fashioning
legal principles to accommodate social movements, and will justify retention of the principles even after the challenges posed by the movements
have passed their acute phase. Thus, the functionalist conception is able
to, if not predict, at least comprehend and endorse the surges of law reform that generate the preferred doctrines of reformist liberals. Moreover, the functionalist conception of legal doctrine as seeking to
rationally order the social system as a whole has an underlying progresive message. It undercuts conservative attempts to sharply limit the
range of prerogatives of state policy planners by positing a clear, unalterable division between the state and civil society. By reconceptualizing
state and civil society as related, interdependent parts of an integrated
social system, the functionalist approach diminishes the salience of the
distinction between private and public sectors, thereby reducing resistance to incremental shifts in the line of demarcation. The idealist-formalist approach by contrast perpetuates the illusion that the state is
qualitatively different from the private sector by depicting social relations
in the latter as by exercises of liberty. Intransigent conservatives wisely
rely upon legal formalism and upon formalist conceptions of principle in
order to keep attention focused on exterior forms of social relations, and
to divert attention from underlying inequalities of power and privilege.
The more perplexing phenomenon is that of reformist liberals who
remain committed to formalist conceptions of principle. This commitment places them on the intellectual defensive by generating a series of
conundrums, some examples of which are: why it is that the libertarian
conception of free speech should not be adhered to absolutely? How it is
that the death penalty could be declared unconstitutional when the framers of the Constitution so clearly favored it? Why it is that nowhere in
the constitutional text can we find the rights to abortion or privacy? And
this being so, how can they exist? Why it is that several of our most
cherished rights come from the New Deal rather than from the signatories of the Bill of Rights? This being so, how is it that these rights can
nonetheless be portrayed as the product of principles that are above politics? If they cannot be so portrayed, then why are they not a form of civil
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disobedience by courts, which we should endorse only reluctantly and
with a sense of shame?
The formalist mode places reformist liberals on the defensive in two
ways. Not only are they precluded from relying upon the need to accommodate social movements as a basis for legal principles, but they also are
likely to have the very conditions against which movements rebel depicted as embodiments of a legitimating ideal- for example, liberty of
contract is used to represent the pre-New Deal economy; freedom of association, the neo-apartheid system of racial segregation that was prevalent prior to 1954.
In practice, reformist liberals who engage in formalist discourse
transcend some of the difficulties by sporadic, inconsistent usage. Thus,
the idealist-formalist linkage of ideals of human association with existing
patterns of social relations is invoked on some occasion and not others,
depending upon whether the status quo is deemed to be in need of reform. When reform is seen as necessary, then ideals shed their one-dimensional character and serve as reference points from which social
change and criticism of the old order are justified. This inconsistency
exacts a price on the coherence of reformist thought since the conceptions of principle are represented to be fundamental, but no explanation
is offered as to how and when principles will sometimes be a crystallization of what is, and at other times be comprised of ideals on a separate
plane that stands above existing social relations.
The reformist might argue that ideals become critical tools when
social relations are oppressive and tyranical. However, to use ideals in
this way on some occasions, while merging ideals with existing social
relations on others is to overlook the substantial degree of exhibition,
needless suffering, and dictatorial rule that are implicit in any classbased, bureaucratized industrial society. It is difficult to say, on the one
hand, that treatment of racial minorities is reprehensible and stands condemned by our shared ideals, and on the other that the legal principles
which sustain social class relations directly embody these ideals. It is too
obvious that the treatment of minorities is at least partially a manifestation of such class relations.
Although the hierarchical and exploitative aspects of our essentially
bureaucratic social order do not compel persons professing liberal values
to reject the legitimacy of the social system, they do cast doubt on how
anyone could simultaneously espouse such values and view existing social relations as the direct embodiment of ideals. Thus, by using ideals
critically on some occasions, the reformist imposes on himself the diffi-
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cult task of explaining how it is that ideals can ever be used in any way
other than critically.
The "real life" answer, which reformist liberals may or may not be
willing to articulate, is that it is a question of politics when the ideals or
"principles" ought to be used to defend or to attack what exists. However, from the pure formalist perspective, this selection reformulation of
principles for the sake of political goals defeats the purpose of having
principles in the first place; it invalidates any attempt to place law above
politics.
The reformist liberal's way out of this morass lies in internalizing
the major insights of the Critical Legal Studies movement in order to
then be able to ground conceptions of legal principle in descriptions of
law that are more realistic than those afforded by contemporary remnants of legal formalism. As to why this has hardly yet been done, there
may be differing explanations. Reformist liberals' hostility to Critical
Legal Studies may stem partly from taking certain CLS scholars at their
word when they make inflated claims about the inherent radicalism of
their message. I have tried to show that CLS attacks on formalist conceptions of principle can serve as a vehicle for expressing a radical rejection
of existing patterns of legal outcomes, but that the attacks themselves do
not compel such a rejection. Rather, the CLS critiques can be viewed as
an invitation to shift from formalist to critical functionalist conceptions.
On a deeper level, reformist liberals' continued adherence to formalist conceptions, notwithstanding the deleterious effects of such, may reflect a prevailing hegemony of politically conservative forces in the
country at large. Many liberals view the attempted separation of law
from politics as a rule of discourse to which they must adhere, even
though they at other times admit that the distinction cannot sensibly be
maintained. Their belief that the distinction is essential to maintain any
underlying conception of principle or of the Rule of Law is erroneous.
The sources of their perceived compulsion, although amorphous, may
stem more from the strength and directness of connection between legal
academia and dominant private sector institutions seeking to contain expansion of welfare-state, reformist liberalism.
There may be yet another explanation. Fashioning realistic accounts
of the role of law in society would cause reformists to feel ambivalence
and insecurity, the contemplation of which discourages them from attempting such a project. Fashioning realistic principles would place a
premium of bodies of historical knowledge and forms of intellectual competence beyond those taught in the traditional law school curriculum. It
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would also impel reformist liberals to confront a pivotal, yet possibly
painful, issue of their political existence. If it is true, as this article has
suggested, that most of the legal doctrines highly valued by reformist
liberals have been generated by elites' accommodating responses to popular movements; that the accommodations have come in response to the
tension of challenges to the existing order, and that law reform works in
the main to stabilize and to reduce tensions between movements and the
established order; then a distinct possibility is raised that reformist liberals live a parasitic existence, working to defuse the very thing that intermittently elevates them to positions of power and provides the energy to
propel those achievements for which they ultimately take credit.
The issue can be addressed, and the reformists' position redeemed,
by a theory of the social system's limited political elasticity-a theory
which asserts that movements may demand only so much, and then repression will be triggered and will likely succeed. Armed by such a theory, reformist liberals may justify their existence by arguing that they
successfully channel movements toward the best outcomes that can realistically be obtained. However, such a theory has not been developed because reformists' commitment to formalist conceptions has largely placed
questions of power and its systematic exercise off limits. By tenaciously
refusing to address questions of the organization and inertia of power
relations, reformists incapacitate themselves from developing the theory
of limited elasticity which would be necessary for a realistic justification
of their political role. Having disarmed themselves in this way, they conclude it is safer to avoid realism altogether and to use the formalist mode,
in spite of its tilt against them.

